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INTRODUCTION
Gambling is a longstanding and major entertainment industry
in the United States,1 and the recent proliferation of sports betting
and casino-style gambling websites has made it “more accessible
than ever before.”2 There are an estimated 1800 Internet gambling
operations currently in existence,3 most based outside the United
States—generally in the Caribbean, Costa Rica or Great Britain,
where they are legal and licensed.4 However, up to 70% of all bets
1

See Edward A. Taggert, Wide-Open City: Gambling, Prostitution Flourish in Tony
Moran Era, at http://www.berkshistory.org/articles/moran.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2005) (“If drinking illegal alcoholic beverages was regarded as the No.1 vice during
Prohibition, gambling was not far behind. The Roarin’ Twenties popularized slot
machines, pinball machines, the numbers game and other lotteries, and horse betting
parlors.”); cf. Todd A. Lubben, The Federal Government and Regulation of Internet
Sports Gambling, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 317, 317 (2003).
2
See Lubben, supra note 1.
3
Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 17,
2004, at 2B.
4
Matt Richtel, Electronic Arts to Stop Advertising for Online Casinos on Its Website,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Richtel, Electronic Arts]; see also Matt
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come from within the United States,5 where there is intense debate
over the legality of Internet gambling under federal law.6
Revenue from online gambling websites exceeded $6 billion in
2003 and was projected to reach more than $7 billion in 2004.7
Seeking to capitalize on this extremely lucrative market, numerous
American corporations began accepting advertisements from
offshore gambling websites in the late 1990s.8 However, the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) warned media trade
groups in June 2003 that accepting advertisements from gambling
websites might constitute “aiding and abetting” illegal operations.9
Thereafter, the DOJ began taking action against some online
gambling advertisers.10
On August 9, 2004, Casino City, Inc. filed a complaint against
the DOJ seeking a “declaratory judgment that advertising online
casinos and sportsbooks is constitutionally protected commercial
free speech under the First Amendment of the United States.”11
Casino City is a Louisiana corporation that disseminates gambling
information, news, strategies, and tips on its websites.12 Although
“Casino City does not conduct or participate in online casino or
Richtel, U.S. Steps Up Push Against Online Casinos by Seizing Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos].
5
See Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, supra note 3.
6
See Gregory Manter, The Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet
Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, July 11, 2003, ¶ 10.
7
Web Site Sues for Right to Run Gambling Ads, supra note 3; see also Matt Richtel,
Companies Aiding Internet Gambling Feel U.S. Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at
A1.
8
Lawrence G. Walters, Advertising Online Casinos: An Analysis of the Legal Rights
and Risks, 7 GAMING L. REV. 111, 111 (2003).
9
Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4; see also Casino City Files Suit
Against U.S. Department of Justice to Establish its First Amendment Right to Advertise
Online Casinos and Sportsbooks, at http://online.casinocity.com/FirstAmendment (Aug.
9, 2004) [hereinafter Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview].
10
See, e.g., Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4 (“United States
marshals seized $3.2 million from Discovery Communications, the television and media
company, in an aggressive effort to crack down on a new target, Internet gambling.”).
11
See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9; see also
Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. Notably, as of May 2004,
“executives at media companies [had] not voiced public challenges to the government
campaign.” Id.
12
Complaint at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-BM3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
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sports book activities,”13 a portion of its revenues are derived from
advertisements for “lawful overseas companies that offer online
casino or sports book gambling.”14 The Justice Department filed a
motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint on October 29, 2004.15
Because the development of Internet gambling advertising law
is still in its nascent stages, the outcome of Casino City’s action
will have significant ramifications for media companies, the
federal government, and Internet gambling operations alike.16 The
Justice Department argues that current federal law prohibits
Internet gambling17 and that advertising for this “illegal” activity
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.18 However,
some legal experts contend that American companies’
advertisements may be protected by the First Amendment
regardless of the legality of online gambling in the United States,19
and that the “‘aiding and abetting’ legal theory is . . . controversial
and unprove[n].”20 Thus, at this point, “the legality of online
gambling itself is still an open question as a result of conflicting
court decisions and stalled legislation, [and] the legal issues
relating to advertising online gambling services are even more
obscure.”21
This Note analyzes Casino City’s declaratory judgment action
to determine whether the DOJ constitutionally may prohibit
Internet gambling advertising, or whether these advertisements are
First Amendment-protected commercial speech.
Part I.A
introduces the federal gambling laws at issue in this case. Part I.B
summarizes the Supreme Court’s development of the commercial
speech doctrine, focusing on the Court’s First Amendment
treatment of advertisements for “vice” activities like gambling.
13

Id. at 3.
Id.
15
See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
16
Cf. Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
17
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19, Casino
City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
18
Id.
19
See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
20
See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4.
21
Walters, supra note 8, at 111.
14
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Part II.A outlines the federal government’s argument that
advertising for gambling websites constitutes “aiding and abetting”
illegal activity, and Part II.B explains Casino City’s argument that
these advertisements are First Amendment-protected commercial
speech. Finally, Part III concludes that the federal government
may prohibit American corporations from advertising sports
wagering websites because Internet sports betting is illegal under
federal law. However, the government may not restrict advertising
for other forms of Internet gambling because these gambling
activities are currently not illegal under any federal laws and do
not satisfy the United States Supreme Court’s requirements for
restricting lawful and nonmisleading commercial speech.
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF GAMBLING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
Traditionally, the United States government has not taken a
strong or active role in gambling regulation.22 In general, the
federal government has left primary responsibility for setting and
enforcing gambling policy to the individual states.23 Nevertheless,
Congress has utilized its power under the Commerce Clause to
enact federal gambling laws “where constitutional provisions, such
as with Indian gambling, were relevant, where there was concern
for the involvement of organized crime, or where the federal
government might have to settle a dispute between states.”24
Congress has also utilized its powers to restrict certain gambling
activities and advertising based on the perceived well-being of the
United States public.25 As a result, the law of Internet gambling
advertising involves the intersection of proposed federal Internet
gambling legislation, existing federal gambling and gambling

22

See James H. Frey, Gambling: Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy: Federal
Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138,
139 (1998).
23
See Anthony N. Cabot and Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling in the Cyberspace Era,
5 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002).
24
Frey, supra note 22, at 139, 141.
25
Cf. id. at 141.
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advertising law, state gambling regulations, and First Amendment
commercial speech.26
A. The Federal Government’s Efforts to Prohibit Internet
Gambling
The federal government contends that Internet gambling is
illegal under federal law, and that it can prosecute Internet
gambling advertisers for “aiding and abetting” illegal activity.27
Congress has been unable to promulgate any legislation that

26

The states’ treatment of Internet gambling is outside the scope of this Note. In brief,
state imposed Internet gambling laws differ from state to state. The variation between
state laws further complicates the legal analysis of Internet gambling. Several states,
including Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, have
expressly outlawed Internet gambling. See Chuck Humphrey, State Gambling Law
Summary, at http://www.gambling-law-us.com/State-Law-Summary (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). In addition, online gambling is illegal in states that prohibit all types of gambling,
such as Utah. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE ISSUES 16 (Rep. No. GAO-03-89) (2002) [hereinafter GAO INTERNET GAMBLING
REPORT], at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf. New York courts have held that
Internet gambling is illegal there under existing state law. See United States v. Cohen,
260 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5401). Both the New York Constitution and General Obligations Law prohibit all betting,
other than certain exceptions for lotteries and horseracing. Id. Not surprisingly, the
gambling states Nevada and New Jersey have considered legalizing some forms of
Internet gambling. The State Legislature of New Jersey recently defeated a proposal that
would have allowed Atlantic City casinos to go online. See M.A. Mehta, Critics Warn
that N.J.’s New Online Wagering Could Leave Bettors . . . Going for Broke, STARLEDGER (Newark, NJ), Nov. 19, 2004, at 51. In July 1997, Nevada Governor Bob Miller
signed a bill that created the misdemeanor of making or accepting a bet over the Internet
from a player located in Nevada. See Nelson Rose, America Boldly Outlaws (and Quietly
Legalizes) Internet Gambling, at http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/amountlaw.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005). However, the bill carved out an exception that “making and
accepting bets on the Internet [were] legal, if the wagers were accepted in Nevada by
Nevada-licensed race and sports books and casinos.” See id. In 2001, Nevada lawmakers
voted “to give the Nevada Gaming Commission . . . the authority to develop rules for
casino operators to launch and maintain online gambling establishments within the state,”
and to promulgate guidelines for such establishments that adhered to state and federal
gambling regulations. See Craig Lang, Note & Comment, Internet Gambling: Nevada
Logs In, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 525, 535–36 (2002). However, Nevada has not
moved forward with its Internet gambling plans due to opposition by the federal
government. Id. at 526–27.
27
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, Casino
City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9,
2004).
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explicitly outlaws Internet gambling.28 However, existing federal
laws proscribe a wide range of gambling activities that reasonably
could be interpreted to include Internet gambling,29 and there are
federal statutes that curtail the advertising of certain gambling
activities.30 At the same time, other federal laws sanction some
forms of gambling, such as state-run lotteries, and casino gambling
for Native American tribes.31 These favored gambling activities
are exempt from most of the federal gambling advertising
restrictions.32
1. The DOJ’s Campaign against Internet Gambling
Advertisers
The federal government began its campaign to prohibit
American corporations from advertising online gambling websites
in June 2003, when the DOJ sent letters to trade groups
representing major broadcasters and publishers, i.e., the National
Association of Broadcasters, the Magazine Publishers of America,
the Independent Press Association, and the National Newspaper
Association.33 The trade groups were advised to warn their
members that they “could be violating [federal] law by displaying
advertisements on behalf of offshore casinos,”34 that they “could
be seen as ‘aiding and abetting’ the activities of the [online]
casinos,”35 and that “individuals accepting such advertisements
might face prosecution.”36
Thereafter, the United States Attorney’s office in St. Louis
convened a grand jury to investigate American companies doing
business with offshore casinos.37 As part of this investigation, the
28

See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 3; see also discussion infra Part I.A.2.
Cf. Walters, supra note 8, at 115; see also discussion infra Part I.A.3.
30
See discussion infra Part I.A.4.
31
See Walters, supra note 8, at 114; Frey, supra note 22, at 147–48.
32
See Walters, supra note 8, at 114; see also infra notes 120, 122–125 and
accompanying text.
33
See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
34
Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
35
Id.
36
Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
37
See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4; Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos,
supra note 4.
29
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Justice Department sent subpoenas to a variety of media outlets,
Internet portals, public relations firms, and other companies,
seeking information about their connections to “offshore casinos”
as well as the purchase and placement of online sportsbook and
casino advertisements.38
Then, in April 2004, the DOJ sent U.S. marshals to seize $3.2
million in advertising proceeds from Discovery Communications.39
The money had been paid to Discovery Networks in October 2003
by Tropical Paradise, an online casino company based in Costa
Rica, for television spots to advertise an online poker room during
the Travel Channel’s broadcast of the “World Poker Tour.”40
“According to court documents, the government seized the money
and told Discovery . . . that it could be party to an illegal activity
by broadcasting the advertisements.”41 Following this seizure,
Discovery Networks stopped accepting advertisements for online
casinos and sportsbooks.42
To avoid prosecution by the DOJ, other major broadcasters,
including
Infinity
Broadcasting
and
Clear
Channel
Communications,
stopped
accepting
online
gambling
advertisements in the fall of 2003.43 Popular Internet portals
Google and Yahoo followed suit in April 2004.44 Yahoo
acknowledged that “‘a lack of clarity in the environment’ made
gambling advertising ‘too risky.’”45 In June 2004, the video game
giant Electronic Arts decided to stop running Internet casino
advertisements on its website as well.46
The Justice Department’s actions have rippled beyond the
realm of advertising. Many American financial institutions have
taken independent steps to prohibit transactions between gamblers
38

See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9; Richtel, U.S.
Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
39
See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
See id.
43
See id.; Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
44
See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
45
Jacob Sullum, Abetting Betting: Is Talking About Online Gambling Illegal?, at
http://reason.com/sullum/040904.shtml (Apr. 9, 2004).
46
See Richtel, Electronic Arts, supra note 4.
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and Internet gambling websites due to the uncertain legal climate
and their assessment of online gambling as a high risk industry.47
For example, both American Express and Discover credit cards
cannot be used for Internet gambling.48 Furthermore, although
MasterCard and Visa do not uniformly restrict the use of their
credit cards for Internet gambling, they have developed procedures
that allow “member banks” to block certain transactions.49 Some
of America’s largest banks, including Citibank, Bank of America,
and Wells Fargo, prohibit their credit cards from being used for
online gambling transactions.50 The same is true for dominant
credit card issuers such as MBNA, Capital One, and Providian
Financial.51 Even the London-based Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (“HSBC”) now bars these transactions.52
Gamblers have also encountered obstacles when adding money to
their gambling accounts through digital money services.53
Numerous electronic money services, including PayPal, have
abandoned this “extremely lucrative market.”54
As a result of the DOJ’s actions, Casino City alleges that it lost
several important advertising deals that would have formed an
important part of the gambling news source’s revenue.55 Before
the DOJ’s crackdown, Casino City’s parent corporation had plans
with A&E Television Networks to promote a “Breaking Vegas”
documentary and an associated sweepstakes in which Casino City
47

See generally GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26.
See id. at 24.
49
See id. at 21.
50
See Nelson Rose, Why Visa Is Dropping Online Gambling, 7 GAMING L. REV. 243,
243 (2003). In the case of Citibank, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer heavily
influenced this decision. See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 8 (“Spitzer accused the credit card
company of knowingly profiting from an illegal activity. This allegation, if prosecuted,
could have resulted in criminal liability under New York law. Citibank denied any
wrongdoing but agreed to contribute $400,000 to compulsive gambler counseling
services.”).
51
Rose, supra note 50, at 243.
52
See id.
53
See id. Eliot Spitzer pursued PayPal after his successful confrontation with Citibank.
See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 9. Although PayPal declared that it had already agreed to
prohibit gambling transactions as part of its acquisition by eBay, PayPal settled with the
State of New York for $200,000 in disgorged profits. Id.
54
Rose, supra note 50, at 243.
55
See Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
48
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was to be featured on the History Channel website and in thirty
national television commercials.56 A&E began promotion for the
company, but then cancelled the partnership agreement.57 A&E
felt there was an “unacceptable risk” that it would be viewed as
aiding and abetting online gambling, since Casino City’s home
page provided links to online gambling websites.58 In addition,
Casino City CEO Mr. Corfman proffered that a major Las Vegas
casino had wanted to work with Casino City’s parent corporation
on a separate promotion, but that its lawyers had called off the
arrangement because of Casino City’s involvement with online
gambling.59 The Justice Department considers its actions to be
justified because it believes that Internet gambling is illegal under
federal law, and there is no First Amendment right to advertise
illegal activity.60
2. Federal Efforts to Enact Anti-Internet Gambling
Legislation
The DOJ’s claim that there is no First Amendment right to
advertise illegal activity rests on the premise that Internet gambling
is illegal under existing, non-Internet specific, federal law.61
Congress has been unsuccessful thus far in its attempts to pass
legislation that specifically outlaws Internet gambling.62 It first
sought to prohibit Internet gambling as early as 1995, which was
when the first casino appeared on the Internet.63 “As part of his
1995 Crime Prevention Act, Senator John Kyl [(R-Arizona)]
introduced a provision that would make it illegal for an individual
to participate in Internet gambling if gambling was illegal in that
person’s state;”64 however, the bill was defeated in committee.65
56

See id.
See id.
58
See id.
59
Id.
60
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17,
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed
Aug. 9, 2004).
61
See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
62
See Lang, supra note 26, at 535–36
63
See id. at 535.
64
Id.
65
See id.
57
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The following year, Congress created the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission to study the “social and economic
impacts” of gambling—including online betting—on the American
public.66 The Commission issued its final report in 1999, which
recommended: “(1) that the federal government prohibit any
Internet gambling not already authorized and encourage foreign
governments not to harbor Internet gambling organizations, and (2)
that Congress pass legislation prohibiting the collection of credit
card debt for Internet gambling.”67 The Commission raised social
and economic concerns about online gambling including
“underage gambling, pathological gambling, lack of consumer
protections, and money laundering.”68 In response to these issues,
Congress asked the United States General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) to study the relationship between United States payment
systems, particularly credit cards, and Internet gambling.69
Another result of the Commission’s report was the numerous
bills to prohibit online gambling that were introduced in
Congress.70 In 2000, the Senate unanimously passed a bill that
created a new statute to prohibit Internet gambling.71 This bill
failed, however, to receive the two-thirds support it needed to pass
in the House.72 In 2002, the House of Representatives passed its
own Internet gambling bill after a series of unsuccessful attempts.73
The Internet Gambling Enforcement Act74 (or “Leach Act”) was
introduced by Representatives Jim Leach (R-Iowa) and John
DeFalce (D-NY), in an attempt to “limit U.S. access to Internet
gambling sites hosted on offshore servers . . . by prohibiting
Internet gambling businesses from accepting credit, electronic
funds transfers, checks or drafts from would-be American Internet
gamblers.”75 The bill also “implicate[d] financial institutions that
66

See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.
Id.
68
Id. at 2.
69
Id.
70
See id. at 7–8.
71
See Lang, supra note 26, at 535. The bill was called the “Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act.” Id.
72
See id. at 535–36.
73
See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 4.
74
H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2002).
75
Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 4.
67
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may [have] knowingly act[ed] as intermediate agents between
gamblers and the Internet gaming business.”76 The Leach Act,
however, died in the Senate without being put to a vote,77 and
subsequent efforts by Congress to pass Internet gambling
legislation have met no better fate.78
3. Existing Federal Anti-Gambling Statutes
Despite Congress’ failure to pass anti-Internet gambling
legislation, the DOJ maintains that Internet gambling is already
illegal under existing federal laws.79 In its motion to dismiss the
complaint of Casino City, the DOJ argued that Internet gambling is
illegal under the Wire Act,80 the Travel Act,81 and the Illegal
Gambling Business Act.82 Therefore, the DOJ can prosecute those
76

See id.
See id. at ¶ 7.
78
See id.
79
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19,
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed
Aug. 9, 2004).
80
Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000)).
81
Pub. L. No. 87-228, § 1(a), 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(2000 & Supp. 2002)).
82
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 84 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(2000)). The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”) also
supports the DOJ’s contention that online sports betting is illegal under federal law. Pub.
L. No. 102-559, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 4227 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04
(2000)). PASPA makes it unlawful for any State, Indian tribe, or person “to sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact” any lottery or
gambling scheme “based directly or indirectly . . . on . . . competitive games in which
amateur or professional athletes participate.” Id. § 3702. PASPA has two major
exemptions. Id. § 3704(a). Subsection (a) has a total of four exceptions, however. See id.
§ 3704(a). First, lawful sports gambling schemes that were in operation when the bill
was introduced were allowed to continue. Id. § 3704(a). This exemption preserved the
licensed sports pools that existed in Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana when the
statute was promulgated, but “barred additional states from sponsoring sports-based
lotteries or betting pools on college [or] professional sports.” Frey, supra note 22, at 146;
see also Jeffrey Rodefer, Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992,
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/sports-protection.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2005). Second, PASPA also exempts gambling on jai-alai and pari-mutuel horse and
dog racing. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(4). Notably, however, the DOJ has not cited PASPA in
support of its advertising restrictions or the contention that Internet gambling is illegal
under federal law. See Rodefer, supra; see, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3). The DOJ strongly
opposed the passage of PASPA since it believed the statute constituted a substantial
77
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who advertise this “illegal” gambling activity under the “aiding
and abetting” statute.83
a) The Wire Act
The Wire Act was enacted by Congress in 1961 “as part of a
series of antiracketeering laws.”84 The goal of the Wire Act is to
assist the States “in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to
gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to aid in the
suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use
of . . . wire communication facilities which are or will be used for
the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and
foreign commerce.”85 Specifically, the Wire Act makes illegal the
use of a “wire communication facility” for the transmission of bets
or wagers on any “sporting event or contest” in interstate or
foreign commerce.86 In general, two elements must be present for
a violation of the Wire Act: (1) the information transmitted by wire
intrusion on states’ rights. See Rodefer, supra (citing 1992 U.S. CODE & CONG. NEWS
3563). To date, the only reported case to interpret PASPA is Greater New Orleans
Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999), in which the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the statute’s exemptions made the scope of its advertising prohibition
“somewhat unclear.” Id. at 180; see also Rodefer, supra. Because the DOJ has been
unwilling to utilize PASPA in any context, the statute will not be considered in this Note.
83
See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
84
Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Wire Wager Act, http://www.gambling-lawus.com/Federal-Laws/wire-act.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
85
David B. McGinty, The Near-Regulation of Online Sports Wagering by United
States v. Cohen, 7 GAMING L. REV. 205, 209 (2003) (citing Letter from Robert F.
Kennedy, United States Attorney General, to Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Apr. 6, 1961) (found in H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633); Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1968)).
The Justice Department has traditionally utilized the Wire Act to prosecute bookies who
accepted and completed bets over the telephone from people in jurisdictions where
gambling is illegal. See id.
86
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000). The full text of subsection (a) of the Wire Act provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a
result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers, shall be fined under this titled or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.
Id.
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must have assisted in the placing of bets or wagers, and (2) the
defendant must have been engaged in the business of wagering or
betting during the time of transmission.87
The Wire Act has several limitations, however. First, the
statute was specifically enacted to prohibit sports betting, and is
ambiguous on other gambling activities.88 Second, the statute does
not apply to any pari-mutuel betting, such as horse or dog racing,
that is lawful under many states’ laws.89 Third, subsection (b) of
the Wire Act contains a safe harbor clause.90 The first safe harbor
exempts the transmission of information “for use in news reporting
87

See Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1968).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
89
See United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1971). Pari-mutuel
wagering is a system of wagering in which bettors bet against one another instead of
against the house. For pari-mutuel wagering, the money bet on a race is pooled, and
approximately 80 percent is returned to the winning bettor. The remaining 20 percent
(the takeout) is distributed among the state government, the jockeys that race at the track,
and the racetrack owners. The amount allotted for the takeout varies among states. See
Para-Mutuel Betting, at http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/p1/parimutu.asp (last visited
Feb. 26, 2005); GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 15 n.30.
Horseracing provides a unique departure from other federal gambling laws. In 1978,
Congress passed the Interstate Horseracing Act (“IHA”) to regulate and promote
interstate commerce with regard to pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. Pub. L. No. 95515, § 2, 92 Stat. 1811 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3001–07 (2000)). Under the
authority of the IHA, numerous states developed systems of pari-mutuel wagering on
state-licensed horse races over the Internet. See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT,
supra note 26, at 15. However, “[i]n March 2000, DOJ officials testified [before the
House Subcommittee on Crime] that it was a violation of the Wire Act . . . to offer bets
on horserace[ing] over the Internet.” Id. at 16. Because the Wire Act is a criminal statute,
the DOJ insisted that IHA, which is a civil statute, could not override it. Id. at 43. IHA,
however, was amended in December 2000 “to explicitly expand interstate off-track
wagers to include wagers through the telephone or other electronic media.” Id. at 16.
Currently, no suits have been brought by the DOJ against the aforementioned “statelicensed horse racing tracks.” Id. at 16. Nevertheless, given the DOJ’s testimony that the
Wire Act trumps IHA, the DOJ’s current position on the legality of interstate Internet
wagering on state-licensed horseracing is unclear. However, the IHA and associated
issues are outside the scope of this Note.
90
The full text of subsection (b) of the Wire Act provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of
sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a
State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
88
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of sporting events or contests.”91 The second safe harbor permits
the transmission of information relating to betting on particular
sports where such betting was legal in both the state from which
the information was sent and the state in which it was received.92
In addition, for the second safe harbor to apply, the information
comprising the transmission must “merely assist” in the placing of
the bets.93 Despite these exceptions, the DOJ can utilize the Wire
Act to harness many types of illegal gambling operations,
especially sports gambling, since the text of the statute specifically
prohibits the transmission of bets or wagers on any “sporting event
or contest.”94
b) The Travel Act
The Travel Act was enacted in 196195 to provide federal
assistance in situations in which local law enforcement was
ineffective in attacking criminal activities that extended beyond the
borders of its state.96 The Travel Act is aimed at prohibiting
interstate travel “with the intent to engage in certain unlawful
behaviors,” including the business of gambling.97 Thus, the Travel
Act makes it a crime to travel in interstate or foreign commerce
with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity,
commit any violent crime to further any unlawful activity, or
otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate any
unlawful activity.98
91

Id.
Id.; see also Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. v. Burrillville Racing Ass’n, 989 F.2d
1266, 1272–73 (1st Cir. 1993).
93
See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13.
94
See 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
95
Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Travel Act Scope and Predicates, http://www.gamblinglaw-us.com/Federal-Laws/travel-act.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (citation omitted).
96
United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1971).
97
Frey, supra note 22, at 142.
98
The Travel Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any
facility in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to—
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime in violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform—
92
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“The Travel Act ‘refers to state law only to identify [a]
defendant’s unlawful activity.’”99 Therefore, a conviction under
the Travel Act necessitates a violation of either a state or local
law.100 Under the Travel Act, the term “unlawful activity”
includes any business enterprise involving illegal gambling.101
Courts have held that the use of “the mail, telephone or telegraph,
newspapers, credit cards and tickertapes is sufficient to establish
that a defendant ‘used a facility of interstate commerce’ to further
an unlawful activity in violation of the Travel Act.”102
c) The Illegal Gambling Business Act
Congress promulgated the Illegal Gambling Business Act as
part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.103 This Act
targets syndicated gambling on the theory that large-scale illegal
gambling operations finance organized crime, which, in turn, has a
significant impact on interstate commerce.104 It is a crime under
the Illegal Gambling Business Act to operate an illegal gambling
business, which is defined as a gambling operation that (1) is in
violation of state or local law where it is conducted, (2) involves
five or more persons that conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of the business, and (3) remains in
substantially continuous operation for more than thirty days or has
a gross revenue of $2000 on any given day.105 Like the Travel
(A) an act described in paragraph (1) or (3) shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; or
(B) an act described in paragraph (2) shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or life.
(b) As used in this section, (i) ‘unlawful activity’ means (1) any business
enterprise involving gambling . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
99
Rodefer, supra note 95 (citing United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 434 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
100
See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b).
101
See id. § 1952(b)(i)(1).
102
Rodefer, supra note 95 (citations omitted).
103
Jeffrey Rodefer, Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970, http://www.gambling-lawus.com/Federal-Laws/illegal-gambling.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
104
See United States v. Lee, 173 F.3d 809, 810–11 (11th Cir. 1999).
105
See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 14. The Illegal Gambling
Business Act provides, in pertinent part:
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Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act requires a predicate
violation of state or local law.106 In addition, the statute includes
all individuals who participate in an online gambling business,
however minor their role,107 but does not target bettors for
prosecution.108 This reflects Congress’ intent for the statute to
target syndicated gambling operations, which are normally run by
organized crime, as opposed to individuals.
d) The “Aiding and Abetting” Statute
Finally, the “aiding and abetting” statute provides that anyone
who “commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.”109 This statute requires a showing that
the defendant “willfully” associates himself with a criminal
enterprise.110 Because the DOJ contends that Internet gambling is
an “offense against the United States,” it reasons that media
companies that willfully advertise for these online gambling

(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or
part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(1) ‘illegal gambling business’ means a gambling business which—
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which
it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a
period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any
single day.
(2) ‘gambling’ includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting
lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000).
106
Rodefer, supra note 103.
107
United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Minn. 1973), aff’d, 508 F.2d
1200 (8th Cir. 1975).
108
See id. at 250.
109
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000). Further, Subsection (b) provides: “Whoever willfully
causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principle.” Id. § 2(b).
110
Lawrence G. Walters, The Law of Online Gambling in the United States—A Safe Bet,
or Risky Business?, 7 GAMING L. REV. 445, 446 (2003).
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websites are “aiding and abetting” criminal activity and may be
punished just as the offshore website operators could be punished
if they were within the jurisdiction of the United States courts.111
4. Existing Federal Gambling Advertising Statutes
In addition to the laws that criminalize illegal gambling
operations, Congress has also enacted federal laws that restrict
gambling advertising.112 The reach of these statutes has been
reduced over the past twenty years, both by Congress in its desire
to encourage certain forms of gambling, and by the Supreme Court
in its development of modern First Amendment commercial speech
jurisprudence.113 Nevertheless, these statutes are relevant to the
Internet gambling advertising debate; particularly to the Supreme
Court’s treatment of gambling advertising under the First
Amendment.
a) The Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934114 prohibits the radio or
television broadcast of any advertisement of any “lottery, gift
enterprise, or similar scheme” that offers prizes dependent upon lot
or chance.115 Courts have interpreted the Communications Act to
prohibit the advertising of private casino gambling as well as
information concerning lotteries.116 When Congress passed the
Communications Act in 1934, the federal government had a
111
112
113
114
115

Id.

See id.
See Walters, supra note 8, at 111–12.
See discussion infra Part I.C.1–3.
48 Stat. 1088 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000)).
See id. The full text of § 1304 reads:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any
such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes
drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme,
whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

116
See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177
(1999); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 290–91 (1954).
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uniform policy of discouraging gambling.117 However, “federal
statutes now accommodate both pro-gambling and antigambling
segments of the national polity.”118
The federal government’s changing perception of gambling is
reflected in the fact that Congress has significantly narrowed the
scope of the Communications Act since 1934.119 In 1975,
Congress amended the Act to allow advertisements for stateconducted lotteries when “broadcast by a radio or television station
licensed to a location in . . . a State which conducts such a
lottery.”120 In 1988, Congress enacted two other statutes that
further curbed the Communications Act’s coverage.121 First, the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act authorized Native American tribes
to conduct various forms of gambling on Indian reservations in any
state that allowed gambling for any purpose,122 and exempted any
gambling conducted pursuant to it from the broadcast restrictions
of the Communications Act.123 Second, the Charity Games
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988 (“CGACA”)124 extended the
Communications Act’s exemptions for state-run lotteries to include
any other lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme if it was not
prohibited by the State in which it operated and was conducted by
any governmental organization, not-for-profit organization, or
commercial organization as a promotional activity “clearly
occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that
organization.”125 Hence, CGACA allows casinos run by state and
local governments to broadcast gambling advertisements without
penalty.126

117

See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 177–78.
Id. at 180.
119
See id. at 178.
120
18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1)(B) (2000).
121
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 178.
122
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2000).
123
25 U.S.C. § 2720 (2000).
124
Pub. L. No. 100-625, 102 Stat. 3205 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1307
(2000)).
125
18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2).
126
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 179. Not-for-profit fishing contests are also
exempted from the Communications Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000).
118
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However, these curtailments of the Communications Act
rendered it a discriminatory statute that favored state-run and
Indian-run casino gambling at the expense of private operators.
The DOJ and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
acknowledged as much in a 1999 brief to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, which stated that the FCC would no longer enforce the
Communications Act broadcasting ban, even in states where casino
gambling was illegal.127 Thus, the federal government recognized
that the Communications Act could no longer withstand First
Amendment challenges in the context of land-based casino
advertising.128 The government, however, has made no such
promise with regard to applying the Communications Act to
Internet gambling advertising, and the First Amendment debate
would be very different in this context because the federal
government’s treatment of online gambling has not been
contradictory or discriminatory.129
b) The Direct Mail Statute
The Direct Mail statute is implicated whenever a gambling
advertisement is sent through the mails.130 This statute prohibits
the “advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any
kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or
chance,”131 and empowers the postal service to prevent its violation
by issuing “stop mail” orders.132 The Direct Mail statute has been
interpreted to prohibit the mailing of newspapers containing lottery
advertisements.133 This carries added significance because both
the Post Office and the FCC interpret the term “lotteries” broadly
to include virtually all forms of gambling, including casino

127
See Kathleen E. Burke, Comment, Greater New Orleans Broadcast Association v.
United States: Broadcasters Have Lady Luck, or at Least the First Amendment, on Their
Side, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 500 (2001).
128
See id.
129
See discussion infra Part II.A.
130
See 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000); see also Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
131
18 U.S.C. § 1302.
132
See Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
133
See Minn. Newspaper Ass’n v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 677 F. Supp. 1400,
1406 (D. Minn. 1987), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 225 (1989).
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gambling.134 Therefore, the Direct Mail statute prohibits most, if
not all, print gambling advertisements.
The DOJ can attempt to utilize the Communications Act and
the Direct Mail statute to restrict online gambling advertisements
via the mediums of radio, television, or mail. The question
remains, however, whether enforcing these statutes against Casino
City and other similarly situated advertisers of Internet gambling
services violates the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids
Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press.”135 Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the First Amendment to afford less protection to commercial
speech than political or religious speech.136 Such disparate
treatment has been justified on the basis that commercial speech
“is not essential to the maintenance of a legitimate, viable
democracy and an informed, active public.”137
A further
justification has been that commercial speech “is purportedly
capable of objective truth, whereas political speech is ripe with
alterative, subjective views. Thus, regulation of commercial
speech does not prohibit the exchange of different views or
endorse one view as truth over another as would regulation of
political speech”138 The Supreme Court used to be particularly
unprotective of commercial speech when it sought to advertise for
“vice” activities, such as gambling, alcohol, and cigarettes.139
Over the past thirty years, however, the Supreme Court has
rejected these exceptions for vice activities and bestowed an
increasing amount of First Amendment protection upon all
commercial speech.140
134

See Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136
Dana M. Shelton, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States:
The Fifth Circuit Upholds the Federal Ban on Casino Gambling Advertising against a
First Amendment Challenge, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (1996).
137
Id. at 1726.
138
Id.
139
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
140
See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
135
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1. History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Until the 1970s, commercial speech was considered to be
entirely outside the realm of First Amendment protection.141
Indeed, in the 1942 case Valentine v. Chrestensen,142 the Supreme
Court set forth the early commercial speech doctrine that while
government may not “unduly burden or proscribe” the freedom of
communication of information or opinion, “the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising.”143 However, in the landmark 1975 case
Bigelow v. Virginia,144 the Supreme Court rejected this
longstanding principle and developed a doctrine that entitled nonmisleading commercial messages to a degree of First Amendment
protection.145
In Bigelow, a Virginia newspaper editor was convicted of
violating a Virginia statute after his newspaper published an
advertisement that described the legality and availability of
abortions in New York.146 The Supreme Court overturned the
editor’s conviction, holding that the statute, as applied,
unconstitutionally infringed his First Amendment rights.147 It
announced that even “commercial advertising enjoys a degree of
First Amendment protection,”148 and that it was error to assume
that commercial speech was “valueless in the marketplace of
ideas.”149 The Court emphasized that the advertised activity
contained a factual message of clear “public interest” to a diverse
audience150 and “pertained to constitutional interests.”151 In
addition, the Court found it significant that the services advertised
in the Virginia newspaper were legal in New York at the time,152
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
316 U.S. 52.
Id. at 54.
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. at 822–23.
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reasoning that the Virginia Legislature could not curtail the
dissemination of information about services that were legal in
another state over which Virginia had no regulatory authority.153
The following term, in the 1976 case Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,154 the Supreme
Court expanded on Bigelow and held that speech that does “no
more than propose a commercial transaction,” such as an
advertisement that lacked any political or social message, was
entitled to First Amendment protection.155 As such, a blanket ban
on advertising the price of prescription drugs in Virginia violated
the First Amendment.156 The Court rejected the state’s “highly
paternalistic approach,” reasoning “that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed.”157
Four years later, the Supreme Court assessed its commercial
speech jurisprudence and set forth a framework to determine
whether regulations that suppressed commercial speech were
permissible under the First Amendment.158 In the 1980 case
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,159 the Supreme Court crafted the
following four-part test for evaluating commercial speech
restrictions:
[1] At the outset, we must determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2]
153

See id. at 824. The Supreme Court stated:
A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of
another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be
affected . . . . It may seek to disseminate information so as to enable its citizens
to make better informed decisions when they leave. But it may not, under the
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from
disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that state.

Id.
154

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 762.
156
See id. at 770.
157
Id.
158
See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
159
Id.
155
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Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, [3] we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.160
A majority of the Supreme Court still utilizes the four-part
Central Hudson framework today to evaluate commercial speech
cases.161
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court held that a New York
regulation that banned advertising by electric utility companies
was “more extensive than necessary” and violated the First
Amendment.162 The majority emphasized that “blanket bans” on
commercial speech should be reviewed with “special care,”163
since special concerns arise from “regulations that entirely
suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related
policy,” which “could screen from public view the underlying
governmental policy.”164 Hence, the Supreme Court dramatically
altered the First Amendment landscape between 1975 and 1980 by
160

Id. at 566 (numbering added for clarity).
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001) (“But here,
as in Greater New Orleans, we see ‘no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as
applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for
decision.’”). Recently, certain judges and scholars have “advocated repudiation of the
Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more straightforward and stringent test
for asserting the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech.” Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999). Contemporary
case law indicates that the Court itself is not completely content with the Central Hudson
test and would prefer something stricter; for example, Justice Thomas has repeatedly
called for the replacement of the Central Hudson test. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Nevertheless, the
majority of the Court’s current position is that although “reasonable judges may disagree
about the merits” of repudiating the Central Hudson standard, it is:
an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that we do not ordinarily
reach out to make novel or unnecessarily
broad
pronouncements
on
constitutional issues when a case can be fully resolved on a narrower ground.
In this case, there is no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as applied
in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for
decision.
Greater New Orleans, 517 U.S. at 184 (internal citations omitted).
162
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572.
163
Id. at 566 & n.9.
164
Id.
161
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extending First Amendment protection to purely commercial
speech and crafting a framework to analyze commercial speech to
determine if it warranted First Amendment protection.
2. The Paternalistic Approach: Early First Amendment
Challenges to Gambling Advertising Restrictions
The gambling advertising restrictions embedded in the
Communications Act and similar state statutes165 have been subject
to numerous First Amendment challenges over the past twenty
years.166 In the early cases, the Supreme Court took a deferential
approach to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test,
submitting to the government’s interest in regulating commercial
speech pertaining to “vice” activities like gambling.
The 1986 case Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico167 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court analyzed a gambling promotion restriction under
the Central Hudson test, and provides a clear example of the
Court’s initial willingness to defer to “paternalistic” governmental
interests in restricting gambling advertising.168 In Posadas, the
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican
statute that legalized certain forms of casino gambling in Puerto
Rico in order to develop tourism but provided that “no gambling
room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their
facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.”169
The Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico’s commercial
speech restriction was reasonable and permissible under the First
Amendment.170 In step one of the Central Hudson test, the
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment was
implicated because the advertisements would concern lawful
activity and would not be misleading or fraudulent.171 In step two,
165

Walters, supra note 8, at 112; see also supra notes 112–129 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 167–238 and accompanying text.
167
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
168
Id. at 340–41.
169
Id. at 332 (citing Puerto Rico Games of Chance Act of 1948, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15,
§ 77 (1972)).
170
Id. at 348.
171
Id. at 340–41.
166
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the Court found that Puerto Rico had a “substantial” interest in
protecting its citizens from gambling’s serious harmful effects on
the public health, safety, and welfare.172 In step three, the Court
had no trouble concluding that the advertising restrictions “directly
advanced” the government’s asserted interest: the Puerto Rican
Legislature had been reasonable in believing that “advertising of
casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve
to increase the demand for the product advertised.”173 Finally, in
step four, the Court found that the broadcast regulations were not
“more extensive than necessary” to serve the Puerto Rico’s
interests, given that Puerto Rico could have banned casino
gambling altogether.174
The Court rejected the broadcasters’ argument that in choosing
to legalize casino gambling the Legislature was prohibited by the
First Amendment from using advertising restrictions to reduce
demand for such gambling.175 Instead, the Court maintained that
“the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling.”176 Therefore, the Court deferred to the Puerto Rico
Legislature’s decision that restricting advertising was the most
effective way to reduce the demand for casino gambling.177
Seven years after Posadas, the Supreme Court entertained a
challenge to the Communications Act and again permitted a
gambling advertising prohibition by deferring to the paternalistic
governmental interest in protecting the public.178 In the 1993 case
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,179 a radio station licensed
in North Carolina, which was a non-lottery state, wished to
172

Id. at 341. The Court was concerned that Puerto Rican residents would have their
“moral and cultural patterns” disrupted, crime and prostitution would increase, and
organized crime rings would develop. Id.
173
Id. at 341–42.
174
Id. at 343–44; Walters, supra note 8, at 113.
175
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46.
176
Id. The Court reasoned “it is precisely because the government could have enacted a
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government
to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through
restrictions on advertising.” Id. at 346.
177
See id. at 344.
178
See generally United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
179
Id.
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broadcast lottery advertisements to its listeners in the nearby state
of Virginia.180 The radio station sought a declaration that the
CGACA, which exempts state-run casinos and certain other
gambling schemes from the Communications Act, violated its First
Amendment rights.181
In applying the four-factor Central Hudson test, the Supreme
Court found that the Communications Act, as amended by the
CGACA, regulated lawful activity and “directly advanced” the
government’s interest in supporting the anti-gambling laws of one
state without unduly interfering with the pro-gambling laws of
another state.182 The Court also found the broadcast restrictions to
be “reasonably fit” on the basis that the government’s interest
could not be achieved as effectively without the regulation.183
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the Communications Act as
applied to the North Carolina radio station, indicating that the
Supreme Court’s early review of the Central Hudson factors was
concerned more with form than substance.184
3. The Modern Analytical Framework: Recent Challenges to
Advertising Restrictions on Gambling and Other “Vice”
Activities
The Supreme Court continues to utilize the Central Hudson
framework. However, the means by which the Court evaluates
each prong has evolved from a paternalistic approach that gave the
government latitude to restrict advertising for “vice” activities185 to
an approach that gave more leeway to advertisers and allowed

180

Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 424.
182
See id. at 433–34. The Court reasoned that “allowing Edge Broadcasting to carry the
lottery advertisements to North Carolina residents would be in derogation of the federal
interest supporting the state’s anti-lottery laws and would permit Virginia’s lottery laws
to dictate what stations a neighboring state may air.” Walters, supra note 8, at 113; see
also Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 434.
183
Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 429–30.
184
See id. at 435; Burke, supra note 127, at 493–94.
185
See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 336 (1986)
(noting that the Court was concerned with the citizens of Puerto Rico being subject to,
and “invited” to participate in, the gambling which was being advertised to tourists).
181
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more information to be disseminated to the public.186 In fact, in
the same year the Supreme Court decided the deferential Edge
Broadcasting case, the Court began to alter its Central Hudson
analysis by putting an increasingly high burden on the government
to justify its bans on commercial speech.187
In the 1993 case Edenfield v. Fane,188 the Supreme Court
toughened its analysis of Central Hudson’s third factor.189 The
Court announced that the government would carry the burden of
showing that the challenged regulation advanced the government’s
interest “in a direct and material way.”190 Furthermore, this burden
cannot be “satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”191
The Edenfield Court emphasized that this requirement was critical
to prevent a state from easily restricting commercial speech “in the
service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a
burden on commercial expression.”192
Two years later, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,193 the
Supreme Court departed further from its deferential approach as it
increased the government’s burden in steps three and four of the
Central Hudson analysis and held that speech restrictions would be
invalid in cases where the government’s actions were irrational,

186

See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (noting that
while the State of Massachusetts might have justified concerns for wanting to restrict
cigarette ads, the ads are nonetheless afforded First Amendment protection because
otherwise the government’s ability to restrict activities that it characterized as a “vice
activity” would be “limitless”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527
U.S. 173, 191 (1999) (“Even putting aside the broadcast exemptions for arguably
distinguishable sorts of gambling that might also give rise to social costs about which the
Federal Government is concerned . . . the Government presents no convincing reason for
pegging its speech ban to the identity of the owners or operators of the advertised
casinos.”).
187
See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
188
Id.
189
See id. at 767.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 770–71.
192
Id. at 771.
193
514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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contradictory, or not supported by substantial evidence.194 In
Rubin, the Court struck down a federal law that prohibited
displaying alcohol content on beer labels.195 The Court first stated
that neither “Edge Broadcasting nor Posadas compels us to craft
an exception to the Central Hudson standard” for vice activities.196
The Court then concluded that under the stricter step three standard
developed in Edenfield, the labeling restriction did not “directly
and materially” advance the government’s asserted interest in
discouraging “strength wars” between brewers because of the
“overall irrationality of the Government’s regulatory scheme.”197
The scheme was irrational because it did not prohibit the disclosure
of alcohol content in advertising, and was not based on any
convincing evidence that the labeling ban actually inhibited
“strength wars.”198 The Court also found that the speech
regulation failed step four of the Central Hudson test because the
government had less intrusive alternatives available.199 Thus,
Rubin marked a departure from the Court’s prior analysis by
requiring more than “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” for
the government’s commercial speech restrictions to pass steps
three and four of the Central Hudson test.200
The following year, building upon the Edenfield and Rubin
decisions, the Supreme Court significantly changed the way
gambling advertising challenges were analyzed, casting doubt on
the prior reasoning in Posadas and Edge.201 In 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island,202 the Court heard an appeal by Rhode Island
alcohol retailers who sought a declaratory judgment that two
Rhode Island laws prohibiting alcohol price advertisements
violated the First Amendment.203 The parties stipulated that the
194

See id. at 488.
See id. at 491.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 488.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 491.
200
Id.; see also Burke, supra note 127, at 494.
201
See Walters, supra note 8, at 113.
202
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
203
Id. at 493. The Court noted that the regulations had to be reviewed with “special
care” because they constituted “blanket bans” on truthful, non-misleading commercial
speech. Id. at 504 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
195
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proposed advertisements did not concern illegal activity and would
not be false or misleading.204 Under step two of the Central
Hudson analysis, the Court expressed skepticism, but accepted as
“substantial” Rhode Island’s proffered interests in promoting
temperance.205 In the third step, the Court noted that because the
regulation constituted a blanket ban, Rhode Island was required to
show that “the price advertising ban will significantly reduce
alcohol consumption.”206 The State failed this test because the
evidence it provided merely “suggest[ed] that the price advertising
ban may have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate
drinkers.”207 Similarly, in the fourth step, the State did not prove
that its speech neglected to “establish a ‘reasonable fit’ between its
abridgement of speech and its temperance goal.”208
In addition, the Court acknowledged that “Posadas erroneously
performed the First Amendment analysis”209 and announced:
[A] state legislature does not have the broad discretion to
suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for
paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was
willing to tolerate. As we explained in Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy, “[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of
its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment
makes for us.”210
Thus, the Court rejected the “legislative judgment” leniency
endorsed by the Posadas majority.211 The Court also discarded
447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)). Following its reasoning in Central Hudson, the Court
explained that blanket bans “usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the
public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. . . . [and] [t]he First Amendment directs us
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.” Id. at 503 (internal citation omitted).
204
Id. at 493.
205
Id. at 504.
206
Id. at 505.
207
Id. at 506.
208
Id. at 507 (internal citation omitted).
209
Id. at 509.
210
Id. at 510 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
211
Id. at 508, 510.
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Posadas’ theory that the power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino
gambling.212 Finally, the Court rejected Rhode Island’s contention
that the price advertising ban should be upheld because it targeted
commercial speech pertaining to a “vice” activity.213 Therefore, in
44 Liquormart, the Supreme Court abandoned the broad legislative
discretion it once had tolerated, holding that the Rhode Island
statutes failed the Central Hudson test and violated the First
Amendment.214
Under this framework, the Supreme Court readdressed the
constitutionality of the Communications Act in the 1999 case
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. U.S.,215 and held that
the statute’s numerous exceptions rendered it unconstitutional as
applied to private casino gambling advertisements in states where
such gambling was legal.216 In this case, an association of New
Orleans-area broadcasters that operated FCC-licensed radio and
television stations filed suit against the United States and the FCC
for a declaration that the Communications Act and FCC’s
implementing regulation, which prohibited broadcasters from
carrying advertisements about privately-operated commercial
casinos regardless of the location of the station or casino, violated
the First Amendment.217
212

Id. at 510–13. The Court stated that it was now “quite clear that banning speech may
sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct.” Id. at 511.
213
Id. at 513. Noting that it has rejected this argument the previous year in Rubin, the
Court reiterated its fear that the scope of any “vice” exception would allow state
legislatures to justify censorship by simply putting a “vice” label on selected activities or
requiring courts “to establish a federal common law of vice.” Id. at 514.
214
Id. at 516. The following year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S.
District Court for New Jersey both considered challenges to gambling broadcasting
regulations under the Communications Act, and utilized the Supreme Court’s 44
Liquormart rationale to depart from earlier interpretations of this federal broadcast ban.
See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997); Players Int’l v.
United States, 988 F. Supp 497 (D.N.J. 1997).
215
527 U.S. 173 (1999).
216
See id. at 176, 190.
217
See id. at 180–81. The broadcasters wished to broadcast advertisements for private
casinos that were lawful in Louisiana and neighboring Mississippi, but feared sanctions
because “signals from Louisiana broadcasting stations [could sometimes] be heard in
neighboring states, including Texas and Arkansas, where private casino gambling [was]
unlawful.” Id.
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The parties stipulated that the advertisements would satisfy the
first step of the Central Hudson test.218 Under step two, the
government identified its interests as: reducing the social costs
associated with gambling, such as compulsive gambling; stopping
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal conduct;
and assisting those states that wish to restrict gambling or prohibit
casino gambling within their borders.219 The Court accepted the
government’s interest as “substantial.”220 However, it noted that
this conclusion was “by no means self-evident,”221 given that “the
social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset,
and sometimes outweighed, by countervailing policy
considerations, primarily in the form of economic benefits.”222
The Court pointed out that “[d]espite its awareness of the potential
social costs, Congress has not only sanctioned casino gambling for
Indian tribes . . . but has enacted other statutes that reflect approval
of state legislation that authorizes a host of public and private
gambling activities.”223
After voicing its reservations about the government’s interest,
the Supreme Court analyzed the broadcast restrictions under the
third and forth prongs of the Central Hudson test and held that as
applied to the broadcasters’ case, the Communications Act violated
the First Amendment.224 Regarding step three, the Court stated
that the “operation of [the Communications Act] and its attendant
regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies
that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.”225 In step four,
the Court found that the regulations were more extensive than
necessary, noting that there “surely are practical and nonspeechrelated forms of regulation . . . that could more directly and
effectively alleviate some of the social costs of casino
gambling.”226 The Court explained that if the federal government
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

See id. at 184.
See id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186–87.
See id. at 188–96.
Id. (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995)).
Id. at 192.
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had “adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights
of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct,
this might be a different case.”227 Finally, the Court pronounced
that “the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does
not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech
about that conduct.228 . . . It is well settled that the First
Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of governmental restrictions
on speech than of its regulation of commerce alone.”229 Due to the
contradictory nature of the government’s proffered interests and
regulations, Greater New Orleans further expanded the First
Amendment protections for gambling advertisements by rendering
the Communications Act unenforceable against casino gambling
advertisements in any state where casino gambling was legal.230
Finally, the 2001 case Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly231
demonstrates the strict scrutiny with which the Supreme Court now
analyzes the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.232
In this case, a group of tobacco manufacturers and retailers
challenged regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney
General regarding “the advertisement and sale of cigarettes,
smokeless tobacco, and cigars.”233 The first regulation at issue
prohibited outdoor advertisements for smokeless tobacco and
cigars within one thousand feet of a school or playground.234 The
Supreme Court found that this regulation satisfied step three of the
Central Hudson test because the State had presented sufficient
evidence of a link between smokeless tobacco and cigar
advertising and demand.235 Under step four, however, the
Supreme Court found that the regulation was more extensive than
necessary to advance the state’s interest.236 The “breadth and
227

Id. at 195 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 193 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509–11 (1996)).
229
Id. (citing Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
230
See id. at 195–96.
231
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
232
See generally id.
233
See id. at 532.
234
See id. at 536.
235
Id. at 561 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
236
See id. (“[T]he ‘critical inquiry in this case,’ requires a reasonable fit between the
means and ends of the regulatory scheme. The Attorney General’s regulations do not
meet this standard.”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
228
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scope of the regulations,” which would have prevented all
advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston, Worcester, and Springfield,
Massachusetts, were too pervasive to be considered narrowly
tailored.237 Further, the “process by which the Attorney General
[had] adopted the regulations d[id] not demonstrate a careful
calculation of the speech interests involved.”238
In sum, the Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech
has undergone an enormous transformation over the past thirty
years. Until the 1970s, commercial speech was afforded no First
Amendment protection.239 Since Bigelow was decided in 1975,
however, the Supreme Court has applied increasingly strict
scrutiny to governmental attempts to restrict advertising, even for
“vice” activities like gambling.240 For a gambling advertising
prohibition to survive a First Amendment challenge today, the
government must either demonstrate that the specific form of
gambling is illegal under federal or state law, or prove through
substantial evidence that the government’s interest is “substantial,”
that the regulation “directly and materially” advances the asserted
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980)). The Court reiterated that step four requires a
reasonable “fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends, . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Id. at 556 (quoting
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995)).
237
Id. at 561–62.
238
Id. at 562. The second Massachusetts regulation at issue was a blanket point-of-sale
advertising restriction that required indoor advertisements to be placed no lower than five
feet from the floor. Id. at 566. The Court held this regulation failed both the third and
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test because it did not reasonably fit with
Massachusetts’ goal of curbing the demand of tobacco products and preventing minors
from using them. Id. The Court noted that “[n]ot all children are less than 5 feet tall, and
those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings.” Id.
The third regulation barred self-service displays for tobacco. The Court held this
restriction did withstand First Amendment scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to
prevent access to tobacco products by minors. Id. at 569–70.
239
David L. Hudson, Jr., Bates Participants Reflect on Landmark Case, at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=14394 (Nov. 18, 2004) ([F]or the
vast majority of the 20th century advertising was not entitled to First Amendment
protection at all. In its 1942 decision Valentine v. Chrestensen the U.S. Supreme Court
wrote: ‘We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising.’ It wasn’t until the mid-1970s
that the U.S. Supreme Court granted commercial speech a degree of First Amendment
protection.).
240
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824–25 (1975).
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governmental interest, and that there is a “reasonable fit” between
the restriction and the asserted interest that demonstrates a careful
calculation of the speech interests involved.241 The Supreme Court
has not yet had an opportunity to apply these standards to Internet
gambling advertisements. However, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana will soon have the occasion to decide
whether the DOJ’s Internet gambling advertising restrictions
satisfy the current Central Hudson standards, or whether Casino
City is correct that the DOJ cannot overcome this threshold.242
II. CASINO CITY VERSUS THE DOJ: THE LEGAL BATTLEGROUND
As discussed in Part I, the United States government contends
that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law, and that, as a
result, the advertising of gambling websites is not protected by the
First Amendment and constitutes “aiding and abetting” illegal
activity.243 Conversely, Casino City argues Internet gambling is
legal, and, thus, it has a First Amendment right to advertise online
casinos and sportsbooks.244 As such, the first issue in this
controversy is whether Internet gambling is illegal activity under
federal law. The second issue is whether Internet gambling
advertising is protected by the First Amendment. If Internet
gambling is illegal under the Wire Act or other federal laws,
advertisements for this activity will fail the first step of the Central
Hudson analysis and will not be protected by the First
Amendment.245 But, if federal law cannot be interpreted to outlaw
Internet gambling, Casino City will prevail unless the DOJ can
satisfy the increasingly strict second, third, and fourth prongs of
the Central Hudson test.246
241

See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).
See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
243
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
244
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
245
Cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564–66 (1980) (“[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose.”).
246
Id. at 566; see supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Court’s increasing strictness in
applying the Central Hudson test).
242
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A. The DOJ’s Case for Prohibiting Online Casino Advertising
In its June 2003 letter, the DOJ advised the National
Association of Broadcasters and other media groups that anyone
who placed advertisements for offshore sportsbooks or online
casinos could be violating various federal and state laws, including
the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business
Act.247 Further, the DOJ warned that these advertisers may be
subject to prosecution for aiding and abetting illegal activities,
pursuant to the federal “aiding and abetting” statute.248 In its
October 29, 2004 motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the
DOJ proffered two main arguments in support of its position.
First, the DOJ’s actions did not violate the First Amendment
because it addressed only the advertising of “unlawful” activity.249
Therefore, “Casino City’s claim fails as a matter of law, for it is
well-established that there is no First Amendment right to advertise
illegal activity.”250 Second, the DOJ’s actions satisfied the
remaining elements of the Central Hudson test, “which . . . are
implicated only if the challenged restrictions regulate speech that is
not misleading and does not concern unlawful activity.”251 The
DOJ argues that Internet and offshore gambling operations are
“particularly pernicious because they can be accessed so easily by
anyone in the country, including particularly vulnerable
populations such as children and compulsive gamblers . . . and also
due to the potential for fraud and money laundering.”252
Therefore, the DOJ maintains that the challenged commercial
speech restrictions would be valid even if Internet gambling was
legal.253

247

Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
Id.
249
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18-19,
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed
Aug. 9, 2004).
250
Id. at 17 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64).
251
Id. at 19. The government also argued that Casino City had no standing to bring the
case, but this argument is not considered in this Note. See id. at 7–15.
252
Id. at 21.
253
See id. at 20–21.
248
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1. Internet Gambling is Illegal under Federal Law
The crux of the federal government’s argument is that “the
First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to
illegal activity.”254 Indeed, in its motion to dismiss, the DOJ stated
that, by definition, “the only speech at issue that the letter [to the
National Association of Broadcasters] identifies as even potentially
subject to criminal liability is speech that is advertising illegal
activity.”255 The DOJ contends that Internet gambling is illegal
under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling
Business Act.256
a) The Wire Act Outlaws Internet Gambling
The DOJ relies primarily on the Wire Act to support its
contention that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law.257
The Wire Act expressly outlaws gambling over the “wires,” as
opposed to merely facilitating the enforcement of existing state or
local gambling laws. Although Congress promulgated the Wire
Act before the Internet existed, the federal government argues that
“if an Internet gaming Web site operating in any country
(including the United States) receives a bet transmitted by an
individual located in the United States, the operator has violated
the Wire Act. For this reason, foreign entities offering gambling to
U.S. citizens through the Internet would be subject to the Wire
Act.”258
The federal government’s broad interpretation of the Wire Act
is supported by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In United
States v. Cohen,259 the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Wire Act
gave the DOJ a mechanism to “harness a sector of the to-date
illusive Internet gambling business.”260 In this case, Jay Cohen
254

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
256
See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
257
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3,
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed
Aug. 9, 2004).
258
GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 12.
259
260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
260
McGinty, supra note 85, at 207.
255
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was prosecuted for operating an Internet bookmaking operation in
Antigua called the World Sports Exchange (“WSE”), which
customers would contact via the Internet or telephone to place
bets.261 A jury convicted Cohen for conspiracy and substantial
offenses in violation of the Wire Act,262 and the Second Circuit
upheld his conviction263 holding that that WSE had engaged in
transmission of bets that were illegal under the Wire Act.264
First, the court rejected Cohen’s argument that the safe harbor
provision of the Wire Act applied to this case. The court reasoned,
“[b]etting is illegal in New York, and thus the safe-harbor
provision in § 1084(b) cannot apply in Cohen’s case as a matter of
law.”265 Next, the court analyzed Cohen’s argument that the
transmissions between his system and customers were limited to
information that enabled customers to place bets entirely from their
accounts in Antigua, where such betting was legal.266 The court
noted that the Wire Act prohibited the transmission of information
assisting in the placing of bets as well as the transmission of bets
themselves.267 Since Internet betting was illegal in New York,
Cohen could not have benefited from the safe harbor even if WSE
had only transmitted betting information as opposed to actual
bets.268

261

Cohen, 260 F.3d at 70.
Id. at 71. At Cohen’s trial, the judge gave the jury the following instruction:
If there was a telephone call or an internet transmission between New York and
[WSE] in Antigua, and if a person in New York said or signaled that he or she
wanted to place a specified bet, and if a person on an internet device or a
telephone said or signaled that the bet was accepted, this was the transmission
of a bet within the meaning of Section 1084. Congress clearly did not intend to
have this statute be made inapplicable because the party in a foreign gambling
business deemed or construed the transmissions only starting with an employee
in an internet mechanism located on the premises in the foreign country.
Id. at 74–75.
263
See id. at 78.
264
See id. at 75–76. The Supreme Court denied Cohen’s petition for writ of certiorari.
Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002).
265
Id. at 74.
266
See id. at 74–75.
267
See id. at 75 (emphasis added).
268
See id. (emphasis added).
262

FRESE

586

4/4/2005 1:17 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:547

The Second Circuit “took a strong stand against Internet
gambling” in Cohen,269 putting “all offshore Internet gambling
businesses . . . on notice that they may be criminally liable if they
accept bets transmitted from within the U.S.”270 In addition, at
least two other courts have indicated that offshore Internet casinos
that accept bets from United States customers violate the Wire Act.
In United States v. Kaczowski,271 the Western District of New York
court found that an online gambling operation had potentially
violated the Wire Act, Travel Act, and various New York state
laws prohibiting the promotion of gambling.272 Further, in People
ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,273 a New York
state court prohibited the continued operation of an Antiguan
online gambling company it found to have violated the Wire Act
and other federal gambling and securities laws.274 Based on this
precedent and the plain meaning of the statute, the DOJ argues that
gambling via online sportsbooks and casinos is illegal under the
Wire Act.275
b) The Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act
Outlaw Internet Gambling
In addition to the Wire Act, the DOJ also cites the Travel
Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act277 in support of its
position that Internet gambling is illegal under federal law. The
federal government contends that these are “[t]he two other federal
276

269

Manter, supra note 6, at 12.
Id. at 14. According to one legal analyst:
If the analysis in the Cohen case is accepted by other courts, it could spell the
death knell for participation in the online gaming industry in the United States,
absent legislation approving it. Even affiliate promotion of [online] casino
websites under the court’s reasoning could result in criminal sanctions against
the unsuspecting webmaster. Although the First Amendment is implicated by
any attempt to regulate truthful speech about a legal product or service, the
concerns created by this court decision are real.
Walters, supra note 110, at 447.
271
114 F. Supp. 2d 143 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
272
Id. at 151–55.
273
714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
274
Id. at 861–63.
275
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
276
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
277
See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000).
270
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statutes with direct applicability to Internet gambling.”278 The
government states that “gambling over the Internet generally
would violate the Travel Act because an interstate facility, the
Internet, is used to conduct gambling” with American
consumers.279 However, a conviction under the Travel Act
requires a predicate violation of either a state or federal law,280 so
it merely provides remedies and enforcement power for other
existing laws, as opposed to making any form of gambling illegal
on its face.281 The same is true for the Illegal Gambling Business
Act.282 Due to this inherent limitation, the DOJ has not relied
heavily on these statutes.283 In its motion to dismiss Casino City’s
complaint, the DOJ did not offer any justification as to why it
believed Internet gambling was illegal under the Travel Act or the
Illegal Gambling Business Act.284
2. Internet Gambling Advertisers are “Aiding and Abetting”
Illegal Activity
As a result of its belief that online gambling is illegal, the
Justice Department argues that American companies that advertise
gambling websites are “aiding and abetting” illegal activity,285 and
can be prosecuted for violating federal law under the “aiding and
abetting” statute.286 This statute requires a showing that the
defendant willfully associated itself with a criminal enterprise.287
The courts have not clarified how far from the actual placing of
bets a company must be to avoid a charge of aiding and abetting or
conspiracy to violate gambling laws.288 However, the DOJ is
278

GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13.
Id. at 14.
280
Rodefer, supra note 95 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1952).
281
See generally id.
282
Rodefer, supra note 103.
283
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
passim, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La.
filed Aug. 9, 2004).
284
See id.
285
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
286
See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see also discussion supra Part I.A.3.e.
287
Walters, supra note 110, at 446.
288
See id. at 447.
279

FRESE

588

4/4/2005 1:17 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:547

attempting to prosecute Internet gambling advertisers under the
“aiding and abetting” statute on the theory that there is a direct link
between the advertisements and online gambling websites, in that
offshore gambling websites would be unable to reach American
consumers without advertising.289
3. Internet Gambling Advertising Restrictions Satisfy the
Central Hudson Test
In its motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the Justice
Department maintains that it could constitutionally prohibit
Internet gambling advertising even if the underlying activity were
legal.290 The basis of this contention is that an online gambling
advertising prohibition would “readily satisf[y] the remaining three
elements of the Central Hudson test, which are implicated only by
restrictions on speech that is not misleading and does not relate to
unlawful activity.”291
The DOJ argues that its actions satisfy step two of the Central
Hudson test because it has a “substantial interest in the
enforcement of its criminal laws, and more specifically, in
reducing aid to illegal gambling operations.”292 The government
cites the cases of Edge Broadcasting,293 Greater New Orleans,294
and Posadas295 as proof that “the Supreme Court has specifically
noted that the government has a substantial interest in reducing
gambling by regulating gambling advertising.”296 In addition, the
DOJ states that “whatever the federal government’s interest in
reducing legal gambling activity, there is no basis for contending
that the government lacks a substantial intent in enforcing laws
proscribing illegal gambling.”297
289

See Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19–22,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
291
Id. at 17.
292
Id. at 19–20.
293
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
294
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185 (1999).
295
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
296
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 12, Casino City (No. 04557-B-M3) (emphasis added).
297
Id. (emphasis added).
290
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The government points to the dangerous nature of online
gambling to further substantiate its interest in preventing online
gambling advertising.298 In its motion to dismiss, the DOJ argues
that Internet and offshore sportsbook gambling operations are
“particularly pernicious because they can be accessed so easily by
anyone in the country, including particularly vulnerable
populations such as children and compulsive gamblers, via a
computer or telephone, and also due to the potential for fraud and
money laundering.”299
Because these issues make Internet
gambling different from, and arguably more dangerous than,
traditional casino gambling, “[e]ven persons who endorse
traditional gambling may have concerns about the unique nature of
Internet gambling.”300
The DOJ’s interest in defending the country against money
laundering by terrorists and organized crime gained prominence
after September 11, 2001.301 United States Representative James
Leach (R-Iowa) introduced an online gambling prohibition into the
early drafts of the USA PATRIOT ACT (“Patriot Act”),302 arguing
that “Internet gambling provided a forum for terrorists to launder
money.”303 The House Financial Services Committee, Justice
Department, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) all
lobbied in support of this bill,304 and House and Senate negotiators
agreed to include it in the Patriot Act.305 However, other
legislators opposed the bill, contending that the connection
298

See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
299
Id. Indeed, the policy reasons most often cited in support of an Internet gambling
prohibition are the risk of money laundering by terrorists and organized crime, the risk of
fraud due to the difficulty to regulate the Internet, the potential increase in gambling
addictions, and the inability to control adolescent access. See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5;
McGinty, supra note 85, at 206.
300
McGinty, supra note 85, at 206.
301
See Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5; see also supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
302
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272.
303
Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5.
304
See Mark D. Schopper, Comment, Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash & Money
Laundering: The Unintended Consequences of a Monetary Control Scheme, 5 CHAP. L.
REV. 303, 309 (2002).
305
See id.
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between Internet gambling and terrorism was too weak to warrant
including this provision in the broader money-laundering
legislation.306 The measure was ultimately dropped from the final
draft of the Patriot Act due to a lack of evidence supporting such a
connection.307 Nevertheless, many government officials continue
to believe that terrorist cells and other dangerous groups are
utilizing gambling websites to launder the proceeds of their illegal
operations.308 And as discussed in Part I, members of Congress are
still trying to promulgate similar legislation to prohibit Internet
gambling.309
The government’s second proffered interest is protecting
Americans from fraud. Internet gambling raises legitimate
concerns about consumer fraud that do not apply to land-based
gambling.310 Casinos operating outside the United States cannot
be regulated by federal or state governments to prevent fraud, and
could escape penalties imposed upon them by American laws and
courts.311 As a result, online gamblers could have difficulty
receiving their winnings, and could not be certain that the online
casino was operating its games “fairly and with the same degree of
chance as land-based games.”312 Conversely, if Internet gambling
websites were licensed within the United States, regulations could
be established to prevent fraud.313 For example, payouts could be
audited to ensure they were fair, and software codes could be
checked to ensure that games of chance were not rigged.314
Third, the DOJ and other proponents of anti-Internet gambling
legislation argue that Internet gambling amplifies the issue of
“problem gaming.”315
While “brick-and-mortar gambling
establishments [have established] safeguards against gambling
addiction and underage gambling[, Internet] gamblers remain
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

Id. at 310.
Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 5.
See generally discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
See Lang, supra note 26, at 548–49.
See id. at 549.
Id. at 548.
See id.
Id.
Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 6.
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anonymous and often use credit cards when placing bets.”316 Also,
“there is no ‘tangible representation of money’ such as betting
chips for users to visualize how much they have won or lost.”317
As a result, “[a]ddicted players [could] lose a life savings or create
thousands of dollars of debt without leaving their home[s].”318 The
anonymous nature of Internet gambling also enables underage
adolescents to bet online, since it is impossible to verify a player’s
age.319
The Justice Department contends that its crackdown on Internet
gambling advertising also satisfies the third and fourth steps of the
Central Hudson analysis.320 Given that “Internet and offshore
gambling operations pose a unique threat of vastly increasing the
pervasiveness and easy accessibility of various types of
gambling,”321 the DOJ reasons:
By punishing and deterring advertising for such operations,
the challenged application “directly advance[s]” the goal of
the statute by reducing the ability of such operations to
solicit customers. There is more than a “reasonable fit”
between this goal and the method of advancing it that
plaintiff challenges in this case. In fact, this application
could not be any more narrowly tailored because it only
prohibits the advertising of illegal activities, and only when
such conduct violates the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2.322
Furthermore, “the connection between advertising an activity
and increased incidence of the activity is the very reason that
Internet gambling businesses pay Casino City money to advertise
for them, and indeed, it is the foundation upon which the entire

316

Id.
Lang, supra note 26, at 550 (citing Jenna F. Karadbil, Note, Casinos of the Next
Millennium: A Look into the Proposed Ban on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 413, 419 (2000)).
318
Manter, supra note 6, ¶ 6.
319
See Lang, supra note 26, at 547.
320
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19,
Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed
Aug. 9, 2004).
321
Id. at 22.
322
Id.
317
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advertising industry rests.”323 Thus, even if Internet gambling
were legal under federal law, the challenged advertising
restrictions are narrowly tailored and no more restrictive than
necessary given the unique and serious threat to American interests
posed by online gambling.324
In sum, the federal government contends that Internet gambling
is illegal under federal law and that its actions satisfy the Central
Hudson requirements for regulating commercial speech.325 The
DOJ’s legality argument rests on its contention that online
gambling is illegal under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act, and that there is no First
Amendment right to advertise illegal activity.326 Under step two of
the Central Hudson test, the DOJ argues that it has a substantial
interest in enforcing its criminal laws and protecting against money
laundering, consumer fraud, gambling addiction, and adolescent
gambling.327 The government also argues that its actions also
satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson analysis
because they are narrowly tailored and no more restrictive than
necessary.328 In contrast, Casino City asserts that online gambling
is legal under federal law and that the First Amendment protects its
advertising.
B. Casino City’s Case that the DOJ’s Ban on Internet Casino
Advertising Violates the First Amendment
In its complaint against the Department of Justice, Casino City
contended that the DOJ’s application of the Wire Act, Travel Act,
Illegal Gambling Business Act, and “aiding and abetting” statute
against it and other similarly situated entities would constitute a

323
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 13, Casino City (No. 04557-B-M3).
324
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
325
See id. at 2–3; Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–2,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
326
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 18–19,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
327
See id. at 19–20.
328
See id. at 22.
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violation of their First Amendment rights because Internet
gambling is a lawful activity.329 As such:
(a) The United States does not have a substantial interest
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free
expression resulting from such application and the threat of such
application; (b) [t]he threatened application would not effectively
serve any purported governmental interest; and (c) [t]he
application was not narrowly drawn to effectuate any purported
government interest.330
Furthermore, in its response to the DOJ’s motion to dismiss,
Casino City argued that “the Internet creates a new challenge for
the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to the First Amendment.”331
Because advertisements placed on Casino City websites are
accessible “anywhere in the world” through the Internet,
“including places where the advertised activities are expressly
legal and places where the advertised activities might be
prohibited,”332 the “DOJ cannot assert that advertisements placed
by Casino City concern per se illegal conduct, unprotected by the
First Amendment.”333
1. Internet Gambling is Lawful Activity
On Casino City’s website, CEO Michael Corfman asserts that
the “public has the right to see the wealth of information we
provide on casinos and sportsbooks, and we have the First
Amendment right to advertise online gaming on the web to support
its free publication.”334 In its complaint, Casino City contends that
the application of the Wire Act, Travel Act, Illegal Gambling
Business Act, and “aiding and abetting” statute against it and
others similarly situated violates the First Amendment.335
Underlying this argument is Casino City’s belief that its
329

See Complaint at 2, 4–5, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
Id. at 3.
331
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 20, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
332
Id. at 18–19.
333
Id. at 21.
334
Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9.
335
See Complaint at 3–4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
330
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advertisements satisfy the first step of the Central Hudson test:
they are about lawful activities and are not misleading.336 Adjunct
to this argument is Casino City’s theory that gambling activity
advertised via the Internet should not be deemed illegal under step
one of the Central Hudson test if it is legal anywhere in the world,
regardless of Internet gambling’s legality in the United States,
since Internet advertisements are accessible “by persons located
around the world where online sportsbooks and online casinos are
not illegal.”337
a) The Wire Act Does Not Outlaw Internet Gambling
Casino City contests the DOJ’s position that the Wire Act
prohibits Internet gambling.338 Although the Second Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Cohen339 supports the DOJ’s
position,340 this decision is by no means fatal to Casino City’s case.
First, the Second Circuit decision involved a sports betting
website, and was silent on the legality of online casinos, for which
Casino City also advertises.341 Second, at least one legal
commentator has argued that the Cohen opinion was not forceful
enough to have a significant effect on the legal landscape because
the Second Circuit did not “use strong language in reference to
Cohen’s Internet use or language to more justly include Internet
use within the scope of the [Wire Act].”342 Had the court done so,
it “could have added incentive and a reasonable precedent for
future courts to make a gradual move toward defining the terms of
the [Wire Act] to include Internet gambling transactions. . . .
ultimately making the [Wire Act] an effective avenue to convict
online sports wagering.”343
Most importantly, the Second Circuit’s decision is not binding
on the other circuits, and the only other circuit court to have
336

See id.
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 22, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
338
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a; see also Walters, supra note 110, at 445.
339
260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
340
See supra notes 260–270 and accompanying text.
341
See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
342
McGinty, supra note 85, at 213–14.
343
Id.
337
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addressed this issue decided in favor of Casino City’s position.344
In the 2002 case In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., the Fifth Circuit ruled
that the Wire Act did not outlaw Internet gambling.345 Here, the
plaintiffs filed suit against MasterCard International, Visa
International, and the banks that issued their MasterCard and Visa
credit cards346 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizational Act (“RICO”)347 seeking to avoid substantial debts
they incurred when they used their credit cards to gamble at online
casinos.348 The plaintiffs identified three substantive federal
crimes—”violations of the Wire Act, mail fraud, and wire fraud”—
as predicates to the RICO violations.349 They alleged that the
defendants, through their association with Internet casinos,350
“participated in and aided and abetted conduct that violated various
federal and state criminal laws applicable to Internet gambling.”351
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not
“show a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of
unlawful debt.”352 Significantly, the plaintiffs could not rely on the
Wire Act as a predicate offense because they had failed to allege
they had engaged in Internet sports betting.353 The court reasoned
that “[b]ecause the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet
gambling, any debts incurred in connection with such gambling are
not illegal.”354 Since the plaintiffs’ debts were legal, the
defendants could not have acted fraudulently when they
represented the plaintiffs’ debts as legal.355 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs could not “rely on the federal mail or wire fraud statutes
344

See In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2002).
See id. This suit arose out of thirty-three virtually identical cases that were
transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana through multidistrict litigation, two of
which were selected as test cases and consolidated for pre-trial purposes. See In re
MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 471 n.1 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d 313 F.3d 257
(5th Cir. 2002).
346
See id.
347
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
348
See In re MasterCard Int’l, 313 F.3d at 259.
349
Id. at 262 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1341, 1343 (2000)).
350
See id. at 260.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 261.
353
See id. at 262–63.
354
Id. at 263.
355
Id.
345
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to show RICO predicate acts” because they had failed “to allege
that they relied upon the Defendant’s representations in deciding to
gamble.”356 Finally, because “neither the Wire Act nor the mail
and wire fraud statutes [could] serve as predicates,” the court noted
that it did not have to “consider the other federal statutes identified
by the Plaintiffs.”357 The court reasoned that the Travel Act and
Illegal Gambling Business Act could “not serve as predicates here
because the Defendants did not violate any applicable federal or
state law.”358
In In re MasterCard, the Fifth Circuit strongly stated that the
Wire Act did not prohibit casino-style Internet gambling.359
Casino City filed its action in the Middle District of Louisiana,360
which is within the Fifth Circuit. Presumably, Casino City expects
that the Louisiana district court will follow the binding precedent
of its jurisdiction and hold that non-sports related Internet
gambling is lawful activity, and that the court will extend its
holding to Internet sports gambling as well.
b) The Travel Act and Illegal Gambling Business Act Do
Not Outlaw Internet Gambling
In addition to the Wire Act, Casino City argues that the
government’s application of the Travel Act361 and Illegal
Gambling Business Act362 against it violates the First
Amendment.363 Because these laws both require a predicate
violation of state or local law,364 at most the DOJ can utilize them
356

Id.
Id. n.27.
358
Id. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the plaintiffs were “independent actors who
made a knowing and voluntary choice to engage in a course of conduct.” Id. at 264. “In
engaging in this conduct, they got exactly what they bargained for—gambling ‘chips’
with which they could place wagers.” Id. Therefore, they could not “use RICO to avoid
meeting obligations they voluntarily took on.” Id.
359
Although it implied that the Wire Act may prohibit online sports betting. See id. at
262.
360
Complaint at 1, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-BM3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
361
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
362
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000).
363
Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
364
See Rodefer, supra note 95; Rodefer, supra note 103.
357

FRESE

2005]

4/4/2005 1:17 PM

THE LEGALITY OF ONLINE GAMBLING ADVERTISING

597

only to help prosecute gambling websites that operate in states that
have explicitly outlawed online gambling.365 Therefore, these
federal laws render Internet gambling illegal.
c) The Federal Government Has Failed to Pass Any
Legislation Outlawing Internet Gambling
In addition, Casino City argues that the majority of Congress
does not share the DOJ’s desire to “protect” the American public
from Internet gambling.366 Casino City’s website provides a
statement from congressional Representative Barney Frank (DMass) in support of this position:
I would have hoped that the American experience with
alcohol in the ’20s and ’30s would have made my
colleagues far more skeptical of new forms of prohibition
than they have been. I agree with you that this legislation
violates the principle of leaving the Internet unregulated,
and violates as well the privacy of millions of Americans.
While I do not myself gamble, I think it is a choice that
adults should be able to make for themselves, and I do not
support restrictions of this sort, especially when it involves
a very intrusive form of regulation of the Internet . . . .367
Similarly, the numerous failed Congressional attempts to
outlaw Internet gambling supports Casino City’s position that
current federal law does not outlaw Internet gambling.368
d) Internet Gambling is Legal in Other Countries that
Access Casino City’s Websites via the Internet
In addition, Casino City contends that because of the Internet’s
borderless nature, an advertisement for a product or service that is
illegal in the United States should be considered “lawful” for

365

Cf. Rodefer, supra note 95; Rodefer, supra note 103.
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
367
Casino City First Amendment Complaint Overview, supra note 9 (responding to a
letter from Casino City CEO Michael Corfman).
368
See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (describing the attempted legislation).
366
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Central Hudson purposes if it is legal anywhere in the world.369
Because Casino City’s website can be accessed throughout the
world, including jurisdictions in which online gambling is legal,
Casino City asserts that the DOJ cannot restrict advertising for
gambling websites regardless of the legality of the underlying
activity in the United States.370 Casino City grounds this argument
in Reno v. ACLU,371 in which the Supreme Court confronted a First
Amendment challenge regarding the implications of pornography
over the Internet.372 Casino City argues that under Reno, “the DOJ
cannot assert that the advertisements placed by Casino City
concern per se illegal conduct, unprotected by the First
Amendment [because t]he Internet is a ‘vast platform’ from which
publishers, advertisers and the like can address and hear from a
‘worldwide audience . . . .’”373
Casino City contends that its claim “is not factually dissimilar
to the broadcasters’ claim in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,”
in which the Supreme Court held that “the power to prohibit or to
regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the power
to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct.”374 Greater New
Orleans concerned activities that were illegal in some states but
not prohibited by federal law,375 as opposed to activities that are

369
See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 22–23, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3)
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
370
See id. at 21–22.
371
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
372
See id. at 584 (striking down the Communications Decency Act’s prohibition on the
knowing transmission of “indecent” material to anyone under the age of eighteen);
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
at 18–21, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
373
Id. at 21.
374
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999)
(internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court first mentioned this doctrine in the 1975
Bigelow case. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–24 (1975). In that decision, the
Court emphasized that the services advertised in the newspaper were legal in New York
at that time, and reasoned that the Virginia Legislature could not curtail the dissemination
of information about services legal in another state over which Virginia had no regulatory
authority. See id.
375
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 176.
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expressly legal in other countries only.376 However, Casino City
argues that its claim is even “more compelling” than the claim in
Greater New Orleans because it “involves substantial and new
considerations not present in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting,”377 including “the implications of the less ‘invasive’
Internet and the accessibility of the commercial speech on the
Internet by persons located around the world where online
sportsbooks and online casinos are not illegal.”378
Casino City supports its position that Internet gambling is not
“illegal” for purposes of the Central Hudson test, regardless of its
legal status in the United States, by referring to a November 2004
ruling by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).379 The WTO
ruled that United States restrictions on Internet gambling violated
free trade commitments the United States made as a member of the
WTO, and that the United States government should drop its
prohibitions on Americans placing bets on online casinos.380
Online gambling operators hailed the judgment a major victory.381
United States officials were quick to denounce the ruling,382 stating
that their WTO commitments were clearly intended to exclude
gambling,383 and calling the ruling “an effort to extend the values

376

Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 21–22, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3) (providing that once advertisements
for online sports books and casinos are on its portal, “the advertisements are available for
viewing by tens of millions of people making up the worldwide audience of the Internet,
many of whom are located in countries where engaging in the conduct that is advertised
is expressly legal”).
377
Id. at 22.
378
Id.
379
See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 19, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Associated Press, Update 1: WTO: U.S.
Should Drop Gambling Ban (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/ap/2004/11/10/ap1647030.html. The WTO decision confirmed a preliminary
ruling issued by the panel in March 2004. Id.
380
See id.
381
Rick Smith & Keith Furlong, Antigua v. U.S., David vs. Goliath: The U.S. Protects
its Own, the World Trade Organization and Online Gaming, Interactive Gaming Council,
at http://www.igcouncil.org/read_news.php?id=5 (May 13, 2004).
382
Id. (arguing that gambling is not included among the “services” in the trade
agreement).
383
See id.
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of other countries to the United States.”384
administration immediately appealed the decision.385

[Vol. 15:547

The Bush

The ruling supports Casino City’s argument that the United
States’ fears about online gambling are not shared by many other
jurisdictions that have legalized online gambling and have access
to Casino City’s webpage.386 Indeed, some of the Internet
gambling websites in dispute are licensed and legally based in
Great Britain,387 and the Canadian football league recently signed a
sponsorship deal with sports gambling websites.388
The
sanctioning of online gambling by nations like Great Britain and
Canada, which have similar economic, social, and security
interests to the United States, seems to refute the Justice
Department’s claims that online gambling is so dangerous it should
be prohibited outright.389 Given the unique global nature of the
Internet, Casino City contends that Internet gambling is “lawful”
under Central Hudson regardless of its legal status in the United
States.
2. Advertising for Gambling Websites Does Not Constitute
“Aiding and Abetting” Illegal Activity
After establishing the legality of Internet gambling, Casino
City’s next argument is that the federal government, having failed
to explicitly criminalize Internet gambling, cannot prosecute
American media companies that advertise these websites under the
“aiding and abetting” statute.390 In its complaint, Casino City
argues that the DOJ’s application of the “aiding and abetting”
statute to it and others similarly situated—specifically with respect
384

Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4. For example, Rep. Michael
Oxley said that “the WTO’s action has significantly reduced its status and credibility as a
reliable arbiter of international trade disputes.” Smith & Furlong, supra note 381.
385
See Smith & Furlong, supra note 381.
386
See generally id.
387
See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
388
See Canadian Press, CFL to be Sponsored by Off-Shore Gambling Company, FORT
MCMURRAY TODAY (Alta.), Oct. 13, 2004, at B2.
389
See Richtel, U.S. Against Online Casinos, supra note 4.
390
See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 21–22, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3)
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004); Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
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to aiding and abetting a violation of the Wire Act, Travel Act, or
Illegal Gambling Business Act—violates the First Amendment.391
The federal government is attempting to prosecute advertisers
through the “aiding and abetting” statute because of the lack of any
explicit federal anti-Internet gambling laws and the fact that only a
small number of states have outlawed Internet gambling.392
However, even if some forms of Internet gambling were illegal
under federal law, the “aiding and abetting” statute requires a
showing that the defendant willfully associated himself with a
criminal enterprise.393 The courts will generally cut off the reach
of a statute “if it is applied to situations absurdly remote from the
concerns of the statute’s framers.”394 Thus far, this “remoteness”
principle has prevented credit card companies from being
prosecuted for aiding and abetting illegal online gambling
enterprises.395 Concerns about the remoteness of association apply
to advertisers as well as credit card companies.396 This argument is
particularly strong for advertisers in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in Greater New Orleans that restrictions
on speech require greater scrutiny than restrictions on the
underlying conduct.397
3. Internet Gambling Advertising Satisfies the Central
Hudson Analysis
To prevail in this action, Casino City will have to prove that
online gambling is lawful activity, and that the government’s
advertising ban violates the second, third, or fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test, which applies when the government attempts
391

Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
393
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Walters, supra note 110, at 446.
394
Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
395
See id. (citing Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (W.D.
Wis. 1999). But see supra note 50 (New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer accused
Citibank of knowingly profiting from an illegal activity, which could have resulted in
criminal liability under New York law. Citibank denied any wrongdoing but agreed to
contribute $400,000 to compulsive gambler counseling services and stopped allowing its
credit cards to be utilized for online gambling).
396
See generally Walters, supra note 8, at 116.
397
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999);
see also supra note 374 and accompanying text.
392
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to regulate speech about legal, nonmisleading activity.398
Regarding step two, Casino City alleges in its complaint against
the DOJ that the “United States does not have a substantial interest
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free
expression” resulting from the DOJ’s actions.399 The Supreme
Court’s recent skepticism toward governmental “interests” in
regulating gambling speech, given all of the pro-gambling statutes
Congress has enacted in recent years, supports Casino City’s
position on this issue.400
Casino City further alleges that the DOJ’s threatened actions
“would not effectively serve any purported government
interest,”401 thereby failing to satisfy step three of the Central
Hudson test.402 Casino City argues that in this case:
The DOJ has no evidence of a harm and certainly no
evidence that its restriction will alleviate the speculative
harm to a “material degree.” . . . Banning U.S. portals from
carrying Internet gaming advertisements does little if
anything to remove the advertisements from the Internet as
foreign based portals will continue to carry them unabated.
This fact wholly undermines the DOJ’s already weak and
speculative argument.403
The inconsistency of the government’s position on alternate
types of gambling—in that it simultaneously encourages state-run
and Indian-run casinos404 and discourages Internet gambling405—
also supports Casino City’s argument that the DOJ’s actions do not
directly advance the governmental interest.

398

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
399
Complaint at 4, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-BM3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
400
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 186–87.
401
Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
402
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
403
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
404
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190–91.
405
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19–22,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
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Casino City also asserts that the government’s “application is
not narrowly drawn to effectuate any purported government
interest”406 and thus the DOJ fails the fourth step of the Central
Hudson test.407 Casino City claims that “[n]o factual record has
been developed or evidence offered” to support the DOJ’s claim of
a “reasonable fit.”408 Furthermore, the government does not have
extra leeway to regulate this commercial speech because it is
related to “vice” activities.409 In 44 Liquormart and subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the government’s
paternalistic interest in restricting advertising for “vice”
activities.410
Casino City argues that the DOJ’s efforts to prosecute Internet
gambling advertisers for aiding and abetting criminal activity fail
the second, third, and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson
analysis, and that the advertisements are thus protected by the First
Amendment; therefore, online gambling is legal under federal law
and satisfies the Central Hudson test.411 Furthermore, Casino City
argues that the aiding and abetting theory is not applicable to
online gambling advertising due to the tenuousness of the link
between the advertisers and any unlawful activity.412 Finally,
based on the Supreme Court’s holdings in Reno and Greater New
Orleans, and the recent WTO decision, Casino City contends that
it has the First Amendment right to advertise online gambling
regardless of the legality of the underlying conduct under federal
law.413
Casino City and the Department of Justice both have
compelling arguments, supported by statutory interpretation and

406

Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
408
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
409
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 513–14 (1996); see also
discussion supra Part I.B.3.
410
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 513–14; supra notes 202–214; see also, e.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 589 (2001).
411
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
412
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
413
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.d.
407
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case law.414 To determine which side should prevail, the two
major issues to be resolved are: (1) whether or not online gambling
is illegal under federal law, and (2) whether the DOJ’s actions
satisfy the final three increasingly strict prongs of the Central
Hudson analysis.
III. UNDER THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST, THE DOJ MAY PROHIBIT
THE ADVERTISING OF ONLINE SPORTSBOOKS BUT NOT ONLINE
CASINOS
An analysis of the federal case law and statutory scheme
through the paradigm of the Casino City action indicates that the
federal government may lawfully prohibit Casino City from
advertising for online sportsbooks but not online casino-style
gambling. The DOJ is correct that the Wire Act makes Internet
sports gambling illegal under federal law.415
Therefore,
advertisements for sports wagering websites constitute commercial
speech regarding an unlawful activity, which will fail step one of
the Central Hudson test and not be protected by the First
Amendment.416 By contrast, neither the Wire Act nor other federal
laws prohibit casino-style Internet gambling, which means the First
Amendment protects advertisements for this activity.417 Although
the DOJ has a “substantial interest” in banning these
advertisements, its actions do not satisfy steps three or four of the
Central Hudson test because they do not directly advance a
substantial government interest and are more extensive than
necessary to serve the government’s interest.418 Therefore, Casino
City should win a declaratory judgment entitling it to continue
advertising online casinos, but prohibiting it from further
advertising online sportsbooks. If the federal government wants to
prohibit casino-style Internet gambling, or impose a blanket ban on

414
415
416
417
418

See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.a.
See id.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See supra notes 401–410 and accompanying text.
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its advertising, Congress “must make its intentions clear in the
form of new legislation” outlawing the activity.419
A. Central Hudson Step 1: Online Casino-Style Gambling Is
“Lawful Activity” but Online Sports Betting Is Not “Lawful
Activity”
Online sports wagering is illegal under the Wire Act;420
therefore, its advertisement is not protected by the First
Amendment under step one of the Central Hudson analysis.421
Conversely, online casino-style gambling is not explicitly
prohibited by the Wire Act or any other federal law,422 it is not
expressly prohibited by the majority of the States,423 and it is not
illegal in the countries where the websites are based.424
Accordingly, advertising for online casinos constitutes lawful
commercial speech that warrants First Amendment protection
under Central Hudson.425
The first step in the Central Hudson analysis is to determine
whether online gambling advertisements are protected by the First
Amendment.426 Central Hudson clearly establishes that the First
Amendment does not protect illegal or misleading commercial
speech.427 In addition, “[c]ase law indicates that the first prong of
Central Hudson generally has been interpreted liberally.”428
An analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of the
Wire Act makes clear that the statute can be applied to transactions
over the Internet. The plain meaning of the phrase “transmission

419

Manter, supra note 6, at 11.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
421
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
422
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952, 1955 (2000 & Supp. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04
(2000).
423
See discussion supra Part I.B.
424
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.d.
425
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
426
See id.
427
See id. at 563–64.
428
Burke, supra note 127, at 486–87 (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418, 426 (1993); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–23 (1975)).
420
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of a wire communication”429 is “flexible enough to allow its
application to Internet gambling transactions”430 even though the
Wire Act was promulgated before the Internet existed.431 This is
because “[a]t some point in all Internet transactions, even so-called
wireless connections that were not possible at the time the [Wire
Act] was enacted, [phone, cable, or other] wires are still typically
used.”432 The legislative intent of the Wire Act supports a broad
interpretation of the phrase “transmission of a wire
communication.”433 Congress promulgated the Wire Act to assist
states in enforcing their gambling laws by prohibiting the use of
wire communication facilities for gambling transmissions in
interstate and foreign commerce.434 The same justifications are
applicable to Internet gambling today because the States that have
outlawed Internet gambling need federal help to pursue the crime
due to the difficulty and expense involved.435 Thus, the Cohen
court correctly held that the phrase “transmission of a wire
communication” could be interpreted to outlaw gambling via the
Internet.436
The Wire Act does not proscribe all Internet gambling,
however – only Internet sports gambling.437 The statute makes
unlawful the wire transmission of bets or wagers on “any sporting
event or contest.”438
There are different opinions as to whether Congress intended
the word “sporting” to modify both “event” and “contest,” or only
to modify “event.”439 While “[a] narrow construction would seem

429

18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000).
McGinty, supra note 85, at 212. “Depending on how Internet technology develops,
however, future Internet communications may no longer be wire communications
covered under the Wire Act.” GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 13.
431
McGinty, supra note 85, at 210; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
432
Id. at 212.
433
See id. at 213; see also Rodefer, supra note 84.
434
See McGinty, supra note 85, at 212–13.
435
See id. at 213.
436
See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2001).
437
See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000); see also In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d
468, 480 (E.D. La. 2001).
438
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
439
See Rodefer, supra note 84.
430
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to suggest that the phrase is limited to sports-related activities,”440
a broad interpretation would encompass traditional casino games
or games of chance, and include non-sports related Internet
gambling in the Wire Act prohibitions.441 The statutory language,
legislative history, and case law all support a narrow interpretation
of the term “sporting event or contest” to render the Wire Act
applicable only to online sports betting.442
The phrase “sporting event or contest” is not defined in the
Wire Act itself.443 However, the definitional section that applies to
the Wire Act444 defines “gambling establishment” as “any common
gaming or gambling establishment operated for the purpose of
gaming or gambling, including . . . a policy game or any other
lottery, or playing a game of chance, for money or other thing of
value.”445 Similarly, under the Illegal Gambling Business Act,446
“gambling includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking,
maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and
conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling
chances therein.”447 Congress’ use of these terms and definitions
indicates that it was aware of the various forms of gambling but
specifically limited the Wire Act’s application to “sporting events
or contests.”448
The legislative history of the Wire Act also supports a narrow
construction of the term “sporting event or contest” in which
“sporting” modifies both “event” and “contest.”449 First, the
legislation was entitled “Sporting Events—Transmission of Bets,
Wagers, and Related Information.”450 Second, the 1961 House of
Representatives Report on Senate Bill 1656 states that the Wire
440

Id.
See id.
442
Id.
443
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
444
18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2000); see also Rodefer, supra note 84.
445
18 U.S.C. § 1081.
446
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000).
447
Id. § 1955(b)(2).
448
See Rodefer, supra note 84.
449
See id.
450
Id. (citing Sporting Events—Transmission of Bets, Wagers, and Related Information
Act, Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491, 552–53 (1961)).
441
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Act was being passed in response to “modern bookmaking” and
interchangeably utilizes the terms “sporting event or contest” and
“sporting event.”451 Third, the 1961 Report contains a letter from
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives that refers only to wagering on sporting events
in its discussion of the legislation.452 Thus, the legislative history
clearly demonstrates the lawmakers’ belief that the Wire Act only
applied to sports betting and not to games of chance.
The holdings of the Second and Fifth Circuits in Cohen453 and
In re MasterCard454 are both consistent with this interpretation of
the Wire Act. Indeed, in Cohen, Jay Cohen was convicted of
running an Internet sports betting operation in violation of the Wire
Act.455 In In re MasterCard, the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs could not rely on the Wire Act as a predicate offense to
their RICO charges because they had failed to allege they had
engaged in Internet sports betting.456 The court stated: “[T]he
Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports internet gambling,”457 and
so “any debts incurred in connection with such gambling are not
illegal.”458 Essentially, the Second Circuit was correct that the
Wire Act prohibits Internet sports wagering,459 and the Fifth
Circuit was correct that the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports
related Internet gambling.460
The statutory text, legislative history, and case law support the
conclusion that Internet sports wagering is illegal under the Wire
Act but other types of Internet gambling are permissible. Because
online sports wagering is not “lawful activity” under United States
law, it fails step one of the Central Hudson test and the DOJ can
451

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631,
2631–33).
452
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631,
2633–34).
453
United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
454
In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
455
See Cohen, 260 F.3d at 71.
456
See In re MasterCard, 313 F.3d at 262.
457
Id. at 263.
458
Id.
459
See Cohen, 260 F.3d at 76.
460
See In re MasterCard Int’l, 313 F.3d. at 263.
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prohibit its advertisement. Casino City’s argument “that the
activity it is advertising is not ‘per se’ illegal [under Central
Hudson] because there are places in the world where Internet
gambling is legal, and because plaintiff cannot control the
community where its advertisements appear due to the nature of
the Internet,”461 is without merit. The Wire Act renders online
sports wagering illegal “everywhere in this country.”462
Furthermore, Casino City “identifies no support in any
jurisdiction . . . for a rule that would allow the world’s most
permissive legal regimes to influence in any way the ability of this
country to enforce its laws.”463 Although Casino City relies on
Greater New Orleans for support, that case concerned land-based
gambling, which was illegal in some states but not prohibited by
federal law.464 It is a huge leap to expand the Supreme Court’s
reasoning to argue that the United States cannot curtail the
dissemination of information about services that are legal in other
countries but prohibited by federal law.465 Since essentially any
product or service can be advertised online today, such a ruling
would severely undermine the government’s law enforcement
power.466 Therefore, Casino City fails step one of the Central
Hudson test with regard to advertising online sports betting.
This logic does not apply to casino-style online gambling,
however, because this activity is not prohibited by the Wire Act.467
Nor is casino-style Internet gambling expressly outlawed by the
Travel Act or Illegal Gambling Business Act.468 Both of these
statutes require predicate violations of state or local law,469 and
could probably be utilized to prosecute Internet gambling outfits
that operated in states that had explicitly outlawed Internet
461

Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, Casino City, Inc. v.
United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (restating Casino City’s argument).
462
Id.
463
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Casino City (No. 04557-B-M3).
464
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
465
See generally id.; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
466
See generally Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8–9,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
467
See supra notes 437–466 and accompanying text.
468
See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
469
18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a), 1955(b)(1)(i) (2000).
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gambling. However, the lack of a federal prohibition, along with
the fact that only a few states have outlawed Internet gambling
thus far, indicates that Internet gambling cannot be considered
illegal under the Travel Act or Illegal Gambling Business Act for
the purposes of the Central Hudson test. This is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s treatment of land-based gambling, which is
legal in some states and illegal in others.470
The Supreme Court has held that one state “may not, under the
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another
state from disseminating information about an activity that is legal
in that [other] state.”471 The Supreme Court would not extend this
holding to protect commercial activities that were explicitly
outlawed under federal law, such as online sports wagering.472
However, the lack of any specific federal prohibition of casinostyle Internet gambling, the fact that most online casinos are legal
and licensed in their countries of origin, and the recent WTO ruling
that United States criminalization of online betting violates global
laws indicate that casino-style gambling is “lawful” for Central
Hudson purposes.473 Together, these factors generate too much
uncertainty for a court to find that non-sports Internet gambling is
illegal under step one of the Central Hudson test.
Because casino-style Internet gambling is not illegal under
federal law, online casino advertisements warrant First
Amendment protection unless the government can satisfy steps two
through four of the Central Hudson analysis.474
B. Central Hudson Step 2: The DOJ Has a “Substantial” Interest
in Restricting Internet Gambling Advertising
The federal government can satisfy step two of the Central
Hudson analysis475 because it has a “substantial interest” in
reducing online casino-style gambling advertising. In this step,
470

Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 187 (1999).
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824–25 (1975).
472
See supra notes 461–466 and accompanying text.
473
See supra notes 369–389 and accompanying text.
474
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
475
See id.
471
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“the Government bears the burden of identifying a substantial
interest and justifying the challenged restriction.”476 Casino City
argues that “the United States does not have a substantial interest
sufficient to justify the imposition upon the exercise of free
expression.”477 However, the DOJ does have a strong interest in
reducing demand for online gambling operations, given that
gambling websites can be so easily accessed by children and
compulsive gamblers, and also due to the potential use of the
websites for fraud and money laundering.478
Although the Supreme Court has been increasingly skeptical of
the government’s proffered interests in regulating commercial
speech related to advertising for land-based gambling and other
“vice” activities,479 thus far it has always been willing to accept the
government’s interest in reducing commercial speech regarding
gambling as “substantial.”480 In Greater New Orleans, the
Supreme Court accepted the substantiality of the government’s
interest in restricting land-based gambling advertisements in order
to reduce the social costs associated with casino gambling and to
assist States that restricted gambling or prohibited casino gambling
within their borders, despite its finding that the social costs were
largely “offset, and sometimes outweighed, by countervailing
policy considerations, primarily in the form of economic
benefits.”481 The Supreme Court was similarly skeptical of Rhode
Island’s alcohol price advertising ban in 44 Liquormart, but
nevertheless found that the state had a substantial interest in
promoting temperance and reducing alcohol consumption.482
The federal government’s interest in restricting advertising for
online casinos is more compelling, and less worthy of skepticism,
than in the context of land-based gambling because of the unique
nature of Internet gambling.
Internet gambling implicates
476

Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).
Complaint at 4, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-BM3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004).
478
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
479
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502–03 (1996).
480
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001).
481
Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 185–86.
482
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
477
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dangerous social consequences that are not applicable to landbased gambling, such as the possibility of terrorist money
laundering and consumer fraud, the inability to prevent children
from gambling, and the inability to safeguard against compulsive
gambling.483 These unique social ills give the government a
substantial interest in restricting this advertising.484
Furthermore, in contrast to the federal government’s
contradictory policies with regard to land-based gambling, its
position against Internet gambling has been consistent and
uniform.485 In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court’s
skepticism about the substantiality of the federal government’s
interest was the result of the government’s simultaneous
encouragement of Native American and state-run casinos and
lotteries and discouragement of privately-operated casinos.486 This
conflicting approach weakened the government’s argument that the
Communications Act should be applied to private land-based
gambling advertising.487 By contrast, the Bush administration’s
policy, like the Clinton administration’s before it, is clearly antiInternet gambling, and Congress has not promulgated any
legislation condoning Internet gambling.488 Therefore, the federal
government has a consistent position of disfavoring Internet
gambling, and can demonstrate that it has a substantial interest in
reducing its demand.489
C. Central Hudson Step 3: The DOJ’s Actions Do Not “Directly
Advance” the Governmental Interest Asserted
Although the federal government has a substantial interest in
prohibiting online gambling advertising, the DOJ cannot satisfy
step three of the Central Hudson test because thus far it has failed
to put forth any evidence beyond speculation or conjecture linking
483

See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); McGinty, supra note 85, at 206–07.
484
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
485
See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
486
See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190.
487
See id.
488
See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
489
See generally discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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online gambling advertising to the ills it hopes to remedy.490 The
DOJ’s efforts to prohibit online casino-style gambling advertising
constitute a “blanket ban” on truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech about lawful conduct.491 Therefore, the government’s
action “strikes at the heart of the First Amendment”492 and must be
reviewed with “special care.”493 This means that under step three,
the DOJ must demonstrate that the ban will significantly advance
the government’s interest.494
Step three also requires that the government’s abridgement of
commercial speech “directly advance” its asserted interest. As
Edenfield instructs, the DOJ must demonstrate that the challenged
advertising restrictions advance its interest “in a direct and material
way.”495 This burden cannot be “satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture,”496 nor by “anecdotal evidence and educated
guesses.”497 Indeed, in 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island failed to
establish a “reasonable fit” between its abridgement of speech and
its temperance goal because it did not provide any evidence of a
connection between its price advertising ban and a significant
change in alcohol consumption.498 Conversely, in Lorillard
Tobacco, the Massachusetts Attorney General satisfied step three
because the state’s tobacco advertising ban was based on studies
that demonstrated a link between advertising and demand for
cigarettes.499 Step three also requires that commercial speech
restrictions be rational and not be contradictory.500 Thus, in Rubin,
the Court struck down a labeling restriction because of the “overall
490

See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 25, Casino City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3)
(M.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 2004); Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); see also
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 574
(1980); cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
491
Cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574.
492
Id.
493
Id. at 566 n.9.
494
Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996).
495
Cf. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (1993).
496
Id. at 770.
497
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995).
498
See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 506–07.
499
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 560–61 (2001).
500
See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488.
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irrationality” of the regulatory scheme, which prohibited the
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels but not in
advertising.501
The DOJ cannot satisfy these high standards in the present
case. It argues that its advertising ban “directly advances” the goal
of the “aiding and abetting” statute because punishing and
deterring advertising for online gambling operations reduces the
ability of such operations to solicit customers.502 However, as
Casino City correctly points out, the DOJ’s assertions are “legally
insufficient” because the DOJ provides “no evidence of a harm and
certainly no evidence that its restriction will alleviate the
speculative harm to a ‘material degree.’”503
The DOJ’s actions clearly do not “directly advance” its interest
in protecting the public from the social problems associated with
online gambling, such as compulsive and underage gambling.504
The Supreme Court has long been skeptical of governmental
efforts to regulate commercial speech for the public’s own good.505
Indeed, 44 Liquormart and subsequent cases established that states
do “not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes.”506 In its
motion to dismiss Casino City’s complaint, the DOJ merely asserts
that reducing advertising will reduce demand.507 The DOJ does
not support its hypothesis with any evidence as to how prosecuting
American advertisers will reduce the social problems associated
with Internet gambling, considering that foreign advertisers could
continue to market Internet gambling to Americans outside the
501

Id.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 22, Casino
City, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Justice (No. 04-557-B-M3) (M.D. La. filed Aug. 9,
2004).
503
Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 25, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
504
See generally id.
505
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 760–73 (1976) (holding that a consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial
information is protected by the First Amendment because such information is necessary
for well-informed private economic decisions).
506
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996).
507
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22, Casino
City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
502
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DOJ’s jurisdictional reach.508 Given the total lack of evidence
provided, the DOJ’s paternalistic interest in preventing the social
ills it associates with Internet gambling cannot justify its blanket
advertising ban under current First Amendment doctrine.509
Furthermore, the DOJ’s actions do not “directly advance” its
interest in protecting Americans from money laundering and
consumer fraud.510 Although the federal government has a
substantial interest in protecting the safety and commercial
interests of Americans that goes beyond paternalism, the DOJ’s
argument that terrorists and organized crime could use gambling
websites to launder money fails step three due to a lack of any
demonstrable evidence.511 The Internet gambling prohibition was
dropped from the final version of the Patriot Act due to the lack of
substantial evidence of a connection between Internet gambling
and terrorism.512 Furthermore, the 2002 GAO Report to Congress
on Internet gambling found that while law enforcement officials
believed that money laundering could potentially be conducted on
gambling websites, no cases of this had ever been prosecuted.513
Additionally, “[r]epresentatives of the credit card and gambling
industries believed that online gambling was not necessarily more
susceptible to money laundering than any other type of on-line
transaction.”514 The mixed views regarding online gambling’s
vulnerability to money laundering, along with the DOJ’s failure to
provide any evidence in support of its contention, destroy its step
three argument.
Likewise, although the DOJ has a substantial interest in
preventing gambling websites from defrauding American
508

See Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
509
Cf. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.
510
See generally Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 25–26, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
511
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–22,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Casino City, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Response
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 25, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); cf. Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
512
Manter, supra note 6, at 5.
513
See GAO INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 26, at 35.
514
Id. While the views of the gambling industry here are not persuasive, the view of the
credit card companies is revealing.
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gamblers, it has not yet offered any evidence that fraud is actually
occurring on these offshore websites.515 Nor has the DOJ
attempted to justify its advertising crackdown on consumer
protection grounds.516 If the fairness of online gambling was really
the federal government’s concern, it would be better alleviated by
sanctioning domestic Internet gambling operations that could be
audited and monitored.517
The Supreme Court has established a First Amendment
doctrine that favors free consumer discourse and sets a high
threshold for the government to justify restrictions on commercial
speech.518 Because the DOJ has not put forth any evidence beyond
“speculation or conjecture” linking online gambling advertising to
the ills it hopes to remedy, its enforcement actions do not “directly
advance” its proffered interests and must fail step three of the
Central Hudson test.519
D. Central Hudson Step 4: The DOJ’s Restrictions Are “More
Extensive than Necessary” to Serve the Governmental Interest
The DOJ’s prosecution of online gambling advertisers also
fails the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis because its
actions are “more extensive than necessary” to achieve its
objective.520 It is well established that step four requires a
“reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends.”521
Here, the federal
government’s actions have not been “narrowly drawn to effectuate
any purported government interest.”522 Therefore, there is no
reasonable fit between the government’s goal of reducing the

515
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17–22,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
516
See id.
517
See Lang, supra note 26, at 548–49.
518
See id.
519
Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); cf. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
520
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
521
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001) (citing Fla. Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995)).
522
Complaint at 4, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
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demand for online gambling and its method of advancing this goal
through advertising restrictions.523
To establish a reasonable fit, the government “is not required to
employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must
demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the
asserted interest.”524 The “challenged regulation should indicate
that its proponent carefully calculated the costs and benefits
associated with the burden on speech imposed by its
prohibition.”525 In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s application of the Communications Act
against private, land-based casinos, holding that “[t]here surely are
practical and nonspeech-related forms of regulation . . . that could
more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costs of
Although Internet gambling is
casino gambling.”526
distinguishable from land-based gambling because most gambling
websites operate outside the jurisdiction of the United States
(which limits the alternative means of regulation such as audits and
other oversight), the DOJ does not appear to have even considered
any alternative means of reducing demand for online gambling
before threatening online gambling advertisers.527
Furthermore, the federal government’s actions are not narrowly
tailored because the DOJ has targeted all types of online gambling
advertising via all mediums, in all states.528 First, the DOJ has not
discriminated between online sportsbooks and casinos.529 If it had
focused on prosecuting Internet sports gambling advertising, it
probably would have been within its authority under the Wire
Act.530 However, the subpoenas issued by the St. Louis U.S.
523

Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556.
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)
(emphasis added).
525
Id. (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 (1993))
(internal quotations omitted).
526
Id. at 192.
527
See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3); Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Casino City (No. 04-557-B-M3).
528
Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562–63, 585 (finding an advertising ban to be “loosely
tailored” due to its geographic scope and the breadth of advertisements it affected).
529
See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
530
See supra notes 420–460 and accompanying text.
524
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Attorney General’s office demanded information about both forms
of gambling, and the money the DOJ seized from Discovery
Networks was not strictly from sports wagering websites.531 The
federal government’s actions are “more extensive than necessary”
because they made no effort to distinguish between the types of
gambling activity being advertised.
In addition, the DOJ’s actions are fatally overbroad because it
has not distinguished between advertising mediums.532 The DOJ
sent its June 2003 warning letters to trade groups representing
major broadcasters and publishers.533 The St. Louis U.S. Attorney
General’s office subpoenaed media outlets, Internet portals, public
relations firms, and other companies.534 This indicates the DOJ did
not attempt to sculpt its actions into the existing federal statutes
that regulate gambling advertising via television, radio, and direct
mail.535 For example, it could have potentially utilized the
Communications Act to bar gambling websites from advertising
via the radio and television in states that had expressly outlawed
online gambling.536 Although the Communications Act has been
limited by recent First Amendment cases in the context of landbased gambling,537 it could probably sustain a governmental
attempt to prohibit the broadcast of online gambling
advertisements because there are no conflicting federal statutes
governing Internet gambling. Accordingly, the federal government
could not be accused of inconsistent or contradictory legislation, as
it was in Greater New Orleans.538 The DOJ’s actions may not
have been considered overbroad if it had only targeted Internet
531

See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
533
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
534
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
535
Cf. Walters, supra note 8, at 115–16 (describing federal regulatory options available
depending on the medium chosen to market online gambling).
536
See discussion supra Part I.A.4.a.
537
See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96
(1999).
538
See id. (holding that that the application of the Communications Act to the broadcast
of gambling advertisements by radio or television stations located in a state where such
gambling was legal violated the First Amendment). However, the Communications Act
does not cover the Internet or cable television because they are not “broadcast” for the
purposes of the Act. Walters, supra note 8, at 115–16.
532
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gambling advertising via direct mail. Since the Direct Mail statute
prohibits the use of the mail to advertise virtually all forms of
gambling,539 this statute would prohibit the use of the mail to
promote online casinos.540
The DOJ overreached by targeting all media outlets—even
companies like Casino City that advertise primarily over the
Internet—in its campaign against online gambling. The inclusion
of Internet advertisers is especially problematic.541 In addition to
the absence of a law similar to the Communications Act to restrict
Internet gambling advertising, the Internet is distinguishable from
television, radio, and direct mail because websites are generally
not targeted to a specific jurisdiction, and can be accessed by users
worldwide.542 “Since Internet advertising is contemporaneously
available everywhere on the planet, and not ‘broadcast’ in the
traditional sense, an analysis based on the location of the
transmission or recipient may be logically flawed.”543 A blanket
ban on Internet gambling advertisements that are distributed via
the Internet is “more extensive than necessary” because it restricts
even advertisements targeted at foreign jurisdictions in which
online gambling is lawful. This is pertinent within the United
States as well, since casino-style Internet gambling is not
prohibited by federal law, and not all states have outlawed Internet
gambling.544
This result may have been different if the
government had, for example, required Casino City to filter its
advertisements by jurisdiction, but the DOJ’s attempt to prohibit
the advertisements outright was “more extensive than
necessary.”545

539

See supra notes 131, 134 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.A.4.b.
541
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
542
See Walters, supra note 8, at 115; supra notes 369–389 and accompanying text.
543
Walters, supra note 8, at 115.
544
See generally id. at 113–15.
545
See id. at 121 (“The inability to effectively geographically limit the target audience
for online gambling advertising may also impair the government’s ability to
constitutionally restrict advertising about online gaming services to areas where it is
considered a legal activity.”); cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
540
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In addition to the mediums of communication targeted by the
DOJ, its actions are also overbroad because it has not
discriminated between states that have outlawed Internet gambling
and those that have not.546 If the DOJ had focused on helping
states that had outlawed Internet gambling, it probably could have
utilized the Communications Act and the direct mail statute to
prohibit the broadcast or direct mail advertising of online casinos
in those states.547 However, the DOJ approached this from the
flawed perspective that all Internet gambling was illegal under
federal law.548 As a result, the DOJ’s actions are “more extensive
than necessary.”
Finally, in a general sense, Casino City’s case for advertising
online casinos is supported by the Supreme Court’s statement in
Greater New Orleans that “the power to prohibit or to regulate
particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to
prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct. It is well settled
that the First Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of
governmental restrictions on speech than of its regulation of
commerce alone.”549 This declaration demonstrates the Supreme
Court’s increasing skepticism of commercial speech restrictions,
and the strict degree of scrutiny with which the Court will evaluate
step four as well as the other steps of the Central Hudson test.550
Therefore, while the Supreme Court would likely uphold a
commercial speech restriction if the underlying product or service
was expressly illegal under federal law, it would be much more
skeptical of barring commercial speech if the underlying conduct
was not illegal nationwide.551
Because the DOJ threatened to prosecute all advertisers of
Internet gambling services instead of limiting its efforts to the
types of online gambling and mediums of communication it could

546

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Parts I.A.4.a–b.
548
See discussion supra Parts I.A.1, II.A.1.
549
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999)
(internal citations omitted).
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Cf. id.
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Cf. id.
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lawfully regulate, its application was “more extensive than
necessary” and will fail step four of the Central Hudson test.552
CONCLUSION
Internet gambling advertising raises unique and controversial
First Amendment issues. Casino City’s declaratory judgment
action is complicated by the fact that all of the Supreme Court’s
past gambling advertising decisions have involved the use of
traditional media, as opposed to the Internet. Thus far, courts have
neither resolved the legality of Internet gambling itself, nor
addressed the effect of the licensure of foreign online casinos.
Nevertheless, an analysis of the First Amendment commercial
speech doctrine and the existing federal gambling statutes reveals
that Casino City should prevail in its claim that it has a First
Amendment right to advertise online casinos, but fail in its attempt
to advertise online sports wagering.
Advertising Internet sports gambling violates the first prong of
the Central Hudson test because the correct interpretation of the
Wire Act renders online sports betting illegal under federal law.
Casino City’s assertion that this activity is not “per se” illegal
because there are places in the world where such gambling is legal
is without merit. As such, advertisements for online sportsbooks
are not protected by the First Amendment.
In contrast, casino-style Internet gambling falls within the
protection of the First Amendment. These advertisements cannot
be considered unlawful because online casinos are not currently
illegal under the Wire Act or any other federal statute. Although
the DOJ has a substantial interest in regulating online casinos due
to the risk of fraud, addiction, and terrorist money laundering, the
DOJ’s recent prosecutorial efforts have not satisfied steps three or
four of the Central Hudson test. The DOJ has offered no proof
beyond “mere speculation or conjecture” that its broad
enforcement actions against American media companies directly
advance its proffered interest. In addition, the DOJ’s efforts are
552
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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“more extensive than necessary” because they target all types of
Internet gambling, mediums of advertising, and states, instead of
focusing on areas in which Internet gambling is explicitly
outlawed, or mediums subject to federal gambling broadcast laws.
If the threats to American interests posed by Internet gambling
are as serious as the federal government fears, Congress should
persist in its efforts to give the DOJ the tools it needs to prevent
offshore Internet casinos from reaching the American public.
However, until new legislation is passed, Casino City will be
entitled to advertise for Internet casinos, and the DOJ will be
limited by the First Amendment to restricting advertising to only
online sports wagering.

